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IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
It has been stipulated among the parties that the
Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah may appear as amicus
curiae for the purposes of Young Electric Sign Company's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Section 35-1-46 U.C.A.

requires all employers in the State to secure payment of
workers compensation benefits by purchasing private
insurance, qualifying as a "self-insured" or by obtaining
insurance from the Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah.
(Hereinafter "WCF")

WCF is a "...nonprofit, self-

supporting, quasi-public corporation..."

[Section 35-3-

3(1)(a) U.C.A.] whose purpose is to "...insure Utah
employers against liability for compensation based on jobrelated accidental injuries and occupational diseases;
and...assure payment of this compensation to Utah employees
who are entitled to it..." [Section 35-3-2(1)(b)(i) and
(ii)].

WCF is charged by its enabling legislation to

"...provide workers1 compensation insurance at an
actuarially sound price..." [Section 35-3-4(1) U.C.A.]

WCF

provides workers' compensation coverage for in excess of
24,000 Utah employers or approximately 80 percent of the
gross number of employers in the State of Utah.

Those

24,000 employers employ approximately 260,000 Utah workers.

1

(See affidavit of Rod Smith, Vice President, Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, Appendix 1 hereto,)

Because of

the breadth of its involvement with the Workers'
Compensation Act of Utah [Section 35-1-1 et seq.] and the
Occupational Disease Act of Utah [Section 35-2-1 et seq.],
WCF believes its input may be of assistance to the Court in
determining whether to grant Young Electric Sign Company's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
WCF is very concerned about the Court of Appeals
decision in Crosland v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992)
(Appendix 2) which it perceives to be a deviation from
historical Utah workers' compensation administrative and
judicial practice.

Over at least the past fifteen years,

employers and their insurance carriers have not been
responsible to pay compensation for preexisting non-work
related physical and mental impairments employees bring to
the work place.

WCF, having participated in the process

leading to the passage of the 1988 amendments to Sections
35-1-66, 35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A., is firmly of the
opinion that the Court of Appeals has misapplied the
standard of review, has misunderstood legislcitive intent and
has misinterpreted the meaning of "...permanent impairment

2

that existed prior to an industrial accident."

Section 3 5-

1-66 U.C.A. (as amended 1988).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reviewing the

Industrial Commission's interpretation of the medical terms
of art in Section 35-1-66 U.C.A. (1966) for correctness and
not deferring to the Commission's experience and expertise
as required by Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A. as explained in
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax
Commfn, 814 P.2d 581 (Appendix 3). Is the interpretation of
the phrase "...Permanent partial disability compensation may
not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior
to an industrial accident" (Section 35-1-66 U.C.A.)(emphasis
added), subject to more than one permissible interpretation
thereby making the interpretation of the Industrial
Commission a policy decision for which the appellate court
should not substitute its judgment?

Morton International,

Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission,
814 P.2d 581 at 589.
2.

Did the legislature intend by its 1988 amendments

to Sections 35-1-66 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. to make employers and
their insurance carriers responsible to pay benefits for

3

preexisting, asymptomatic and undiagnosed non-work related
phys ica1 impa irments ?
3.

See Also, "Certiorari Inquiries" and "Ultimate

Issues on Appeal" in brief of Amicus Curiae Utah SelfInsurers' Association and "Question Presented for Review" of
Young Electric Sign Company in its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, each of which WCF adopts as its own.

OPINION OP THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WCF joins as Amicus Curiae in Young Electric Sign
Company's Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the Utah Court
of Appeals decision in Crosland v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, attached hereto as
Appendix 2. WCF also adopts as its own the arguments
contained in the Amicus Curiae Brief of Utah Self-Insurers'
Association.

The Court of Appeals was reviewing the

Industrial Commission of Utah Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order dated September 11, 1990 (Appendix 4).

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
WCF agrees with the statement of this Court's
jurisdiction in Young Electric Sign Company's Petition for
Writ of Review.

4

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
The following provisions of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) are controlling and
attached as appendices:
Section 63-46b-16, U.C.A.
(Standard of Review)
Section 35-1-66, U.C.A.
(Permanent Partial Disability)

Appendix 5
. . . . Appendix 6

Section 35-1-69, U.C.A. (Apportionment
with Employers' Reinsurance Fund in
Cases of Permanent Total Disability) . Appendix 7
The controlling Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure is:
Rule 46 (Considerations governing
review of certiorari)

Appendix 8

The controlling medical definition of "permanent
impairment11 is:
American Medical Association
Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment

Appendix 9

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
WCF adopts as its own Young Electric Sign's Statement
of the Case in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OP PACTS
WCF adopts as its own Young Electric Sign's Statement
of Facts in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

5

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT OP APPEALS USED AN IMPROPER STANDARD OF
REVIEW BY FAILING TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TECHNICAL MEDICAL TERM OF
ART "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT" AS IS REQUIRED BY SECTION 63-46b16 U.C.A. FAILURE TO GIVE SUCH DEFERENCE CONFLICTS WITH
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN MORTON INT'L INC, V, AUDITING DIV.
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMM'N, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991),
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that this Court will consider reviewing a decision
of the Court of Appeals "When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state...law in a way that
is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court". In
this instance, the Court of Appeals has misconstrued the
Standard of Review required by Section 63-46b-16, U.C.A. it
should have applied to the Industrial Commission's
interpretation of medical terminology in a statute. The
Court of appeals decided:
...This case requires an
interpretation
of the 1988 amendment to the Workers'
Compensation Act and thus presents a
question of statutory
construction
and
legislative
intent which we may review
for correctness.
Under this
higher
standard, to afford relief
we must find
that the Commission
erroneously
interpreted
the law to Crosland1s
substantial
prejudice.
Crosland, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
This Court, however, stated the standard of review
which should apply in a circumstance as presented here where

6

terms in a statute may be subject to more than one
legitimate meaning and there is an absence of legislative
intent1:

. . .However, in the absence of a
discernible
legislative
intent
concerning the specific
question in
issue, a choice among permissible
interpretations
of a statute is
largely
a policy determination.
The agency that
has been granted authority to administer
the statute is the appropriate body to
make such a determination.
Indeed, both
the legislative
history to section 6346b-16 and our prior cases suggest that
an appellate court should not
substitute
its judgment for the agency's judgment
concerning the wisdom of the agency's
policy.
When there is no
discernible
legislative
intent concerning a
specific
issue the legislature
has, in
effect,
left the issue unresolved.
In such
case, it is appropriate to conclude that
the legislature
has delegated
authority
to the agency to decide the
issue...
The crux of t h i s case i s what i s meant by the
limitation the legislature placed on payments of permanent
partial d i s a b i l i t y benefits in 1988 when i t added the
language "...Permanent partial d i s a b i l i t y compensation may

WCF takes the p o s i t i o n hereinafter in Point 2 that the l e g i s l a t u r e
intended the employer t o be responsible for the i n d u s t r i a l injury only and not
for a nonindustrial physical or mental anomaly for which medical experts can
determine a percentage of impairment though the anomaly was not diagnosed and
was asymptomatic before the i n d u s t r i a l injury. There i s nothing in the
Workers' Compensation Act as amended in 1988 from which the Court of Appeals
could have reasonably concluded t o the contrary. We g i v e the Court of Appeals
perhaps unwarranted deference by implying in t h i s argument that i t s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s among more than one l e g i t i m a t e meaning of the terms in
question.

7

not be paid for any permanent impairment t h a t e x i s t e d prior
t o an i n d u s t r i a l accident" t o s e c t i o n 35-1-66 U.C.A.
The Court of Appeals opined t h a t
permanent

impairment

M

(1988).

. . . [ W ] e b e l i e v e t h e term

should be i n t e r p r e t e d t o r e f e r t o a

r a t a b l e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n e x h i b i t i n g some diminished
function."

Crosland, supra, a t 183 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 37.

(Emphasis added)
U n t i l 1990, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e did not choose t o g i v e a
d e f i n i t i o n t o t h e medical term "permanent impairment". 2

In

t h a t void i t i s e n t i r e l y proper for t h e I n d u s t r i a l
Commission t o use t h e e x p e r t i s e i t has gained i n i n t e r a c t i n g
with t h e medical community.

I t was proper for t h e

Commission t o r e l y on t h e medical panel i t appointed in t h i s
case and i t s own experience t o determine t h a t "impairment"
means " . . . w h a t i s wrong with t h e h e a l t h of an i n d i v i d u a l "

2

.
In 1990, t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n amendments passed by t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e merely c o d i f y t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the I n d u s t r i a l Commission has
c o n s i s t e n t l y applied over t h e years and did in f a c t use in t h e present case:
35-1-44.

D e f i n i t i o n of terms.
******
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically
impaired as to function. Disability can
be total or partial, temporary or
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
******
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical
condition reflecting any anatomical or
functional abnormality or loss.
Impairment may be either temporary or
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
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(See Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
Chapter 1, Third Edition, 1988, pp. 1-6, Appendix 9 hereto).
It was within the scope of its charge by the Commission for
the medical panel to examine and report its opinions
concerning the extent and permanency of the impairment.

The

Industrial Commission should be given deference of
interpretation of medical terms.

It was within the

Commission's prerogatives as the finder of facts to rely on
the opinions of the Medical Panel as to the issues of
permanent partial impairments.

(See also, Utah Self-

Insurers' Association's Amicus Brief.)

2. UTAH CASE LAW INVOLVING APPORTIONMENT OF
COMPENSATION BENEFITS BETWEEN THE EMPLOYERS* REINSURANCE
FUND AND EMPLOYERS OF INDUSTRIALLY INJURED WORKERS AS WELL
AS THE 1988 AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 35-1-66 AND 35-1-69
U.C.A. MAKE IT CLEAR THAT EMPLOYERS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
PREEXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITIONS WHICH EMPLOYEES BRING WITH
THEM TO THE WORK PLACE. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
THIS IMPORTANT CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN A MANNER THAT
SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO ALL
EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS IN THE STATE.
A. THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND IS IN CONFLICT WITH
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ESTABLISHED UTAH PUBLIC POLICY
TO HIRE AND RETAIN AS EMPLOYEES THOSE WHO HAVE
PREEXISTING PHYSICAL AND MENTAL LIMITATIONS.
Interpreting the critical language in Section 35-1-66
U.C.A. presents an issue of first impression to this Court.
It is an issue of vital concern to all employers and all
employees in the State of Utah.

9

The final decision will

have a significant impact on not only the amount of
compensation injured employees may receive, but may also
significantly affect the premiums employers will have to pay
to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage.

The

decision may also significantly impact the costs of
providing compensation benefits for those employers which
qualify as self-insureds.
Rodney C. Smith)

(See Appendix 1, Affidavit of

In this instance "...the Court of Appeals

has decided an important question of ...state...law which
has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court."
Rule 46(d) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Though Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise The Law
of Workmen's Compensation states that the maijority of
jurisdictions have opted to not attempt to apportion payment
for permanent partial disability compensation between
preexisting nonindustrial injuries and subsequent industrial
injuries, he acknowledges that a certain number of states do
apportion,

id., Section 59, Successive

2, P. 10-492.329, 1992.

Disabilities,

Vol.

It is clear from the language

"Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid
for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident" of Section 35-1-66 U.C.A., Utah falls

10

in l i n e with those s t a t e s which do apportion.
66 U.C.A.

Section 3 5 - 1 -

(1988). 3

The 1988 amendment t o Section 35-1-66 U.C.A. was
designed by the L e g i s l a t u r e t o perpetuate a concept c l e a r l y
pronounced in the l i n e of c a s e s beginning with Intermountain
Health Care. Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977).

That

i s , in Utah the employer i s not r e s p o n s i b l e t o pay permanent
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation e i t h e r for manifested or
quiescent preexisting conditions.

That r u l e of law arose in

the context of apportionment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for payment
of compensation between employers and the Second Injury Fund
(now Employers 1 Reinsurance Fund) of S e c t i o n s 35-1-68 and
35-1-69 U.C.A. 4

See a l s o , Intermountain Smelting Corp. v.

Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980); Northwest Carriers v.
I n d u s t r i a l Com'n, e t c . . 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981); American
Coal v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984); Second Injury
Fund v. P e r r y ' s M i l l , 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984).

"...Where

I t i s important t o note that the l e g i s l a t u r e did not choose t o put
s i m i l a r l i m i t a t i o n s on the payment of temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation
(Section 35-1-65 U.C.A.), temporary p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation (Section
3 5 - 1 - 6 5 . 1 U.C.A.) or medical b e n e f i t s (Section 35-1-45 U.C.A.). Accordingly,
in t h i s case not involving a permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , Young E l e c t r i c Sign
Company q u i t e appropriately paid a l l such b e n e f i t s without apportioning
between the p r e e x i s t i n g condition and the i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r i e s .
4

.
The l e g i s l a t u r e a l s o amended Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. in 1988 t o
l i m i t apportionment consideration between employers and the Employers 1
Reinsurance Fund t o permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y cases (Section 35-1-67 U.C.A,)
and t o s e t a s p e c i f i c a l l o c a t i o n of c o s t s between the Employer's Reinsurance
Fund and the employer.
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the disability is the result of pre-existing conditions and
not an industrial accident, a claimant is not entitled to
disability benefits."

Large v. Industrial Commission of

Utah. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) at 957.

B. THE DRAFTERS OF THE 1988 AMENDMENT TO SECTION
35-1-66 U.C.A. DID NOT INTEND TO SHIFT THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYING COMPENSATION FOR ANY
PREEXISTING NON-WORK RELATED CONDITION TO EMPLOYERS.
THE CROSLAND COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY VERIFYING THAT INTENT.
It was the intent of those recommending the 1988
amendment to Section 35-1-66 to the legislature to insure
that employers would only be responsible to pay permanent
partial disability for the industrially caused impairment,
not that attributable to preexisting conditions.

The

Crosland Court did not discuss legislative history which
verifies that intent.

The heading of House Bill 218

(attached as Exhibit A to Appendix 10, Affidavit of Stuart
L. Poelman) states the purpose of the bill:
AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION;
CHANGING THE NAME OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND;
CLARIFYING THAT PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
COMPENSATION ENTITLEMENTS ARE BASED ON
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT CAUSED BY AN INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT: ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ON PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
CLAIMS AND PROVIDING AN OFFSET BASED ON
CERTAIN OTHER INCOME; MODIFYING PROVISIONS
REGARDING AWARDS FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND;
MODIFYING PROVISIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUING
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION AS IT RELATES
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TO STATUTES OF LIMITATION; CLARIFYING THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO CONTROL
MEDICAL CARE OF INJURED EMPLOYEES; AMENDING
THE PREMIUM TAX IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND
INJURY FUND; PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL ASPECTS OF ACCIDENTS;
AMENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS; MAKING
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN
EFFECTIVE DATE. (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of House Bill 218 was to amend the Workers1
Compensation Act of Utah to insure the fiscal integrity of
the Second Injury Fund (now Employers' Reinsurance Fund)
That Fund had been facing insolvency because it had been
paying a proportionate share of medical expenses, temporary
total disability compensation and permanent partial
disability compensation in addition to permanent total
compensation on cases involving preexisting permanent
partial disability claims since the Ortega, supra, decision
in 1978.

The Fund had more money being paid out in claims

than it was taking in through the means provided it by state
law.

House Bill 218 alleviated that threatened insolvency

by increasing the Fund's income while decreasing the claims
obligations placed on it by the Ortega interpretation of
Section 35-1-69 U.C.A.

House Bill 218 increased the premium

tax paid by employers or their insurance carriers, reduced
apportioned reimbursement to employers of benefits in nonpermanent total cases, eliminated benefits paid to injured
employees for preexisting conditions not involving permanent
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total disability and established a precise schedule of
apportionment between the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
employers in permanent total disability cases.
House Bill 218 was not intended to transfer any of the
prior apportionment liabilities of the Employers1
Reinsurance Fund for permanent partial disability
compensation benefits to employers.

The intent was instead

to "...eliminate permanent partial disability benefits...to
the extent that [they] relate...to permanent partial
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions....

It was

never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer
liable for compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting
conditions.

All preexisting conditions related to

asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial
impairment were to go uncompensated."

(Affidavit of Stuart

L. Poelman, Appendix 10)
WCF viewed House Bill 218 as not in any way increasing
its responsibility to pay compensation benefits for
preexisting conditions of its insureds' injured employees.
"Rather, WCF understood workers would no longer be
compensated for any permanent partial disability related to
pre-existing medical problems...."
of Rodney C. Smith)

(Appendix 1, Affidavit

That understanding is supported by the

Fiscal Note to House Bill 218 prepared by the Legislative
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Fiscal Analyst which is silent as to any effect on
employers1 responsibilities for preexisting conditions.

To

the contrary, the Fiscal Note states, "In addition, preexisting injuries which are aggravated by an industrial
accident will no longer be eligible for compensation from
the Second Injury Fund."

(See Exhibit A to Appendix 1,

Affidavit of Rodney C. Smith)
Professor Arthur Larson states very succinctly the
controlling humanitarian public policy adopted by the Utah
Legislature and acknowledged by this Court in prior
decisions cited hereinbefore:
While at first
glance it might appear
that the apportionment
rule favors
the
employer and non-apportionment
the
employee, in practice
the nonapportionment
rule proved the worse of
the two evils
from the standpoint
of the
handicapped worker.
As soon as it
became clear that a particular
state had
adopted a rule reguiringr an employer
to
bear the full cost of total
disability
for loss of the crippled
worker's
remaining leg or arm, employers had a
strong financial
incentive
to
discharge
all handicapped workers who might
bring
upon them this kind of
aggravated
liability.
When loss of a single
eye
might mean a compensation liability
of
$5,000 for a man with two good eyes but
$26,000 for a man with only one, the
compensation
insurance premium on the
latter
would naturally
be markedly
greater.
It has been said, for
example,
that within the thirty
days
following
the announcement of the nonapportionment
rule in Nease v. Hughes
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Stone Company (citation
omitted),
between seven and eight thousand
oneeyed, one-legged,
one-armed,
and onehanded men were displaced
in Oklahoma.
The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Arthur Larson, Vol. 2,
Sec. 59.13, pp. 10-492.397 through 10-492.398, 1992.

It is

the public policy in Utah to encourage and not discourage
employers to initially hire and thereafter retain in
employment those who may bring physical or mental impairment
to the work place.
Capitano. supra.

See eg. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v.

In exchange for that policy, employers are

relieved of the responsibility to pay compensation for those
non-work related conditions the employee brings to the
employment.

The Court of Appeals failed to recognize the

significance of that public policy in making its
determination.

3. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-1-66 U.C.A. BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENES THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE IN THE
STATUTE AND THE GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY.
WCF defers to and adopts as its own the argument set
forth in Young Electric Sign Company's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

WCF will not elaborate further on this point

though other argument points may overlap Young Electric Sign
Company's arguments.
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4.
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO
RULE 46(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN CROSLAND V. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, supra. AND NYREHN V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 800
P.2d 330 (UTAH APP. 1990) (APPENDIX 11) CONFLICT ON THE
ISSUE OF APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN INDUSTRIALLY CAUSED PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT AND THE IMPAIRMENT ARISING FROM AN ASYMPTOMATIC
PREEXISTING CONDITION.
Regarding the above argument point, WCF adopts as its
own and refers the Court to the argument in the amicus brief
of Utah Self-Insurers' Association without further
elaboration.

5.
THE COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION OF "PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT" FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 35-1-66 U.C.A.
(PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY) CREATES A CONFLICT WITH THE
USE OF THE SAME TERM FOR PURPOSES OF THE TEST FOR
COMPENSABLE ACCIDENTAL INJURIES (SECTION 35-1-45 U.C.A.) AS
ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF ALLEN V.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND HOLLOWAY V. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION.
The Crosland. supra, definition of "preexisting
impairment" as excluding actual preexisting physical
conditions which have not previously been rated because they
were undiagnosed and asymptomatic prior to an industrial
event, conflicts with prior decisions by this Court. The
test for a compensable accidental injury is pronounced in
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and
clarified in Holloway v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 31
(Utah 1986).

The compensability test places a heavier

burden which is called "legal causation" on one who brings a
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preexisting impairment to the work place.

In the Holloway

concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman made it clear that
latent, undiagnosed preexisting impairments which are
lighted up by an industrial event invoke the heavier "legal
causation" burden of proof on the claimant.

WCF defers to

and adopts as its own Utah Self-Insurers' Association's more
detailed argument of this point in its amicus brief.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has improvidently awarded benefits
to an injured worker for a preexisting physical impairment.
Contrary to Sections 63-46b-16, U.C.A., Utah Administrative
Procedures Act and Morton International, supra., the Court
of Appeals failed to give deference to the Industrial
Commission's interpretation of the statutorily undefined
term of medical art, "permanent impairment."
The opinion in Crosland is in conflict with the result
in Nyrehn in which another panel of the Court of Appeals
remanded a case with similar facts to the Industrial
Commission for further findings of fact.
The Court of Appeals decision creates an intolerable
inconsistency in the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah.
Preexisting "permanent impairment" will mean that
asymptomatic and undiagnosed, though retrospectively
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ratable, will be compensable for purposes of Section 35-1-66
U.C.A.

However, for purposes of determining whether there

is an underlying compensable industrial accident, an
undiagnosed and asymptomatic condition will invoke the
higher "legal causation" standard of the Allen and Holloway
cases.
Alternatively, Crosland could be viewed as authority
paving the way for a totally new standard of legal causation
to determine compensability of alleged industrial accidents.
For example, an asymptomatic preexisting condition might be
viewed to not invoke the higher causation standard of Allen,
in direct contradiction to the explanation of the standard
provided in Holloway.

This Court should review Crosland so

that such a mixed message as to the important Allen tests
for industrial accident compensability is put to rest.
Absent such action by this Court, a tide of additional
Industrial Commission litigation is likely.
The Crosland decision further goes contrary to a long
line of Utah decisions which emphasize the controlling
public policy to encourage the hiring and continued
employment of those who bring physical and mental impairment
to the work place.

The Crosland decision to the contrary

dissuades employers from hiring the impaired individual.
Contrary to the strong public policy, Crosland encourages
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the release of those already employed once the previously
undiagnosed and asymptomatic condition is discovered through
an industrial accident.
The Court of Appeals also did not examine any
legislative history in divining its concept of legislative
intent.

The intent of the drafters of House Bill 218 did

not intend the result of the Crosland opinion.

To the

contrary House Bill 218 was designed to insure the fiscal
integrity of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and not to
place additional responsibility for compensation benefits on
employers.
This Court should grant certiorari to review these
issues which have a far reaching direct and indirect effects
on nearly every Utah citizen.

DATED this ^7fi

WORKERS1 COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH

day of May, 1992.

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

By: O ^ ^ ^ ^ X J ZTL^yA
By:.
(J
Dennis V. Lloyd
General Counsel

J^mes R. BlacJ
Xttorney f o r Amicus Curiae
feprkers' Compensation Fund
of Utah
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No. 910291CA

*

Comes now the affiant, Rodney C. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

Affiant has been employed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,

hereafter WCF, for over ten years and currently serves as Executive Vice President.
2.

Affiant by reason of his capacity as Executive Vice President and in the

normal course of his duties has personal knowledge of the WCF's operations, as well as
statistical data related to such operations, and WCF's legislative interactions.
3.

WCF provides workers compensation insurance coverage for approximately

24,000 Utah employers or about 80 % of the total number of employers in Utah.

4.

WCF covers some 260,000 workers employed by the Fund's 24,000 insured

policyholders.
5.

Affiant has personal knowledge that the payment of benefits not

contemplated within the statutory framework of Chapters One and Two of Title 35 will
increase the insurance rates and premiums paid by WCF's insured employers.
6.

WCF did not view House Bill 218, as passed by the Utah State Legislature

in 1988, as increasing employer liability for an injured worker's permanent partial
disability compensation related to asymptomatic permanent partial impairment caused by
pre-existing medical conditions. Rather, WCF understood workers would no longer be
compensated for any permanent partial disability related to pre-existing medical problems.
The primary fiscal impact of House Bill 218 foreseen to affect employers was the increase
in premium tax allowed by the new law which was intended to infuse the Second Injury
Fund with over $5,000,000 in operating capital.
7.

WCF received no feedback from the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst

describing House Bill 218 as making employers or their insurers liable for permanent
partial disability compensation related to permanent impairment caused by pre-existing
medical conditions. The Analyst's February 1, 1988 Fiscal Note regarding House Bill 218
merely states, "In addition, pre-existing injuries which are aggravated by an industrial
accident will no longer be eligible for compensation from the Second Injury Fund." (See
attached Exhibit A)
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EXHIBIT A

DATED this

/<f •fU

day of.

AA.Q-<*

_, 1992.

KodneyC/Smith
Vice President,
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
Subscribed and sworn to before me this £ ^ d a y of May, L992
NOTARY P O i l

OEBRA k NELSON

Notary Public

2323 East 2880 South
Salt Lake City. Utari 84109
My Commission Expires 2/5<9b

Residing at JaM

STATE O F U T A H _ _ j

My commission expires
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Th is bill increase s t he pr emium t ax on Worke r's
Insurance from the current 3 3/4% to 8% as follows
.ows:
FY

.50%
.257.

.50%
.25%

7.25%
0.00%
.50%
.25%

3.75%

8.00%

I, Q£Z

V • \J W/«

• J. \J /*

Based
i:>ri, a- i an niia 1 p r e m i u m ,
$133 ,61)0 „ 000
Iu
$ 1 4 4 , 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 in F T 1 9 9 0 , the increases w o u l d lie .is follows:

Second Injury Fund
Industrial Commission - Industrial Accidents

FY

FY
1989

ISM
Second 11 ij ury Fund
Industrial Commission - Industrial Accidents
Uninsured Employers - Fund
General Fund

Compensat:

I'Y

1 989

J: i!
1989

FY
1990

$5,544,400
133,600

$6,149,800
0

and

In addition, pre-existing injuries which are aggravated bj an
industrial accident will/no longer be eligible for compensation from the
Second Injury Fund. This will decrease expenditures from the Second
Injury Fund for both compensation to employees and reimbursements to
employers and carriers.' • These expenditures will decrease approximately
$137,000 in FY 1989 and $656,000 in FY 1990. These expenditures will
continue to decrease until FY 1996 when there will be no expenditures for
this purpose. This will save approximately $4.0 million based on current
disbursements. The time lag is due to the eight-year time period during
wh i ch the in j u r ed p e r s on may f :i ] e an a pp 3 i c a t i on f o :r c omp en s a t i o n .
This bill includes hospitals, clinics, and other medical providers in
compliance requirements. This is estimated to require one additional FTE
at a cost of $20,000, funded from the Second Injury Fund. The net effect
of this bill in FY 1989 "would be an increase $5,661,400 to the Second
Injury Fund, and $133,600 to the Industrial Commission for Industrial
Accidents.
In FY 1990, the Second Injury Fund would increase by
$6,785,800, of this amount, approximately $2,400,000 would be pai d f rom
the Workers" Compensation Fund, wh ich is not a State budgetary fund
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST

Appendix 2
Crosland v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah
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proficient in his work. General
knowledge or expertise acquired
through employment in a common
calling cannot be appropriated as a
trade secret. "The efficiency and
skills which an employee develops
through his work belong to him and
not to his former employer." Hailmark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v.
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d
933, 936 (1978). The same principles
apply to the covenant here. We
hold that the covenant not: to
compete had the effect of preventing the defendant from exploiting
skills and experience which he had a
right to exploit.
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted).
The trial court and the majority ignore the
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have
made the requisite showing under Rule
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial
court can conclude that a covenant not to
compete is enforceable, it must first determine
that the employee was not engaged in a
common calling and that the employer has a
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at
627. A generalized assertion that preventing
the completion of a former employee will
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough.
Id, at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at
426.
In this case, defendant Lari y Benson was a
of butcher supplies. He was a route
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade
secrets. He was not involved in management.
As a result of his common calling, he necessarily knew both the actual and potential customers for the goods he sold in the communities of his territory. Customers of butcher
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a
scan of local telephone books would quickly
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are
not found on a secret customer list.
The majority does not even address the issue
of whether Benson was engaged in a common
calling It rests solely on the specious rationale
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route
salespersons are commonly viewed in their
territories as representatives of their employers. But that is no reason to hold them in
semi-bondage to their former employers
when they change jobs. The majority notes
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. The law, however, does not protect
only less able individuals.
The consequence of the majority's ruling is
that a noncompetition covenant may be enforced against any route salesperson whenever
it could be said that the employer may lose

,

.

££

some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former
employee is not restrained from competing.
That, of course, can be said with respect to ail
route salespersons, no matter how common
their callings.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be modified after it goes into effect. However, the law is
that a movant must first show some change in circumstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed circumstances that bear upon the issue of when the
injunction should have commenced.
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a professional person solely responsible for building the
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy.
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IN T H E
TTT*H COURT OF APPEALS
Gary E. CROSLAND,
Petitioner,
^.
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial
Commission of Utah; Young Electric Sign
Co.; and Smith Administrators,
Respondents.
No. 910291-CA
FILED: March 20, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City,, for
Petitioner
J. Angus Edwards, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Petitioner, Gary Crosiand (Crosiand), seeks
review of an Industrial Commission order
awarding him compensation for one-half of
his industrial accident injury and denying
compensation for the remainder. Crosiand was
denied compensation for the half of the injury
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of
a preexisting asymptomatic condition We
reverse.
BACKGROUND
On February 9, 1989, Crosiand injured his
lower back as he attempted to help another
employee move a 200-pound sign while
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when,
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted
his upper torso. When he could barely walk
the next day at work, his employer sent him
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating
physician concluded that Crosland had a preexisting asymptomatic defect and that the
industrial accident caused the defect to become
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adjuster's examining physician determined that
Crosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spondylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis
(forward movement of the body of one of the
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below
it), adding that ail the present symptoms
Crosland suffered were related to the industrial injury. Crosland had never had any back
problems or required medical treatment for his
back prior o this accident.
The medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that following the accident, Crosland had a twenty
percent permanent partial impairment of the
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the
industrial accident and half to the asymptomatic preexisting condition medically aggravated by the accident. The panel commented
that "(i]t is entirely possible he could have
gone on for an indefinite period had it not
been for the event described, but it is unlikely
he would have had the degree of difficulty had
he not had the developmental abnormality."
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied
Crosland compensation for the ten percent
permanent partial impairment attributable to
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggravated by the industrial accident, thus allowing compensation only for the ten percent
whole body permanent partial impairment
attributable to the industrial accident itself.
The Industrial Commission affirmed.
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should
receive compensation for the entire twenty
percent whole person permanent partial impairment caused by the industrial accident's
aggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic
condition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This proceeding is governed by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 &
Supp. 1991).» Section 63-46b-16(4)(d)
governs the scope of our review of the Industrial Commission's order, allowing relief if
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced"
because "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." In Morton Int'U Inc.
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991),
the supreme court held that under this section
we may review for correctness and need not
defer to the agency's interpretation unless

Rep.

35

CODE^CO
P-OVO

nan

j there is "a grant of discretion to the agency
I concerning the language in question, either
j expressly made in the statute or implied from
the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When
j legislative intent can be discerned, however,
| we give the agency's interpretation no deference. Id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of
Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App.
I 1991). This case requires an interpretation of
the 1988 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act and thus presents a question of
statutory construction and legislative intent
which we may review for correctness. Under
this higher standard, to afford relief we must
find that the Commission erroneously interpreted the law to Crosiand's substantial prejudice.
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an
industrial injury and that he has satisfied both
the medical and legal cause requirements of
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986).3 The sole issue on appeal is
whether Crosland should receive compensation
for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting
condition which was aggravated by his industrial accident and contributed to the injury.
Utah courts have followed the wellestablished common law rule that when an
industrial accident lights up or aggravates a
preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting
disability is compensable as long as the industrial accident was the medical and legal cause
of the injury. Nuzum v. RoosendahJ Const,
and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah
1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum
to add the higher standard for legal
cause when preexisting conditions are involved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus.
Comm'n, 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App.
1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n,
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received
compensation for detached retina resulting
from work-related accident, even though
employee's prior cataract surgery rendered
him somewhat predisposed to retinal detachment). This rule is consistent with the stated
policy of liberally construing and applying the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of
affording financial security to injured employees. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984)
(citation omitted). In addition, the rule comports with Professor Larson's comments:
Nothing is better established in
compensation law than the rule
that, when industrial injury precipitates disability from a latent prior
condition, such as heart disease,
cancer, back weakness and the like,
the entire disability is compensable,
and except in states having special
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statutes on aggravation of disease,
no attempt is made to weigh the
relative contribution of the accident
and the preexisting condition to the
final disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in such cases,
nor in any case in which the prior
condition was not a disability in the
compensation sense.
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation L JW,
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted).
Juxtaposed against this strong common law
background allowing an employee compensation for aggravation of a preexisting latent
condition is the policy of freeing an employer
from liability for an employee disability existing prior to the work-related accident. For
permanent partial impairments, this policy is
effectuated by the medical and legal causation
requirements of Alien.4 In addition, by amendment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature
added the following language to the Workers'
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid for anypermanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. §35-166 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic
weakness in Crosiand's back was a
"permanent impairment" within the meaning
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The
stated purpose of this amendment to section
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial
disability compensation entitlements are based
on physical impairment caused by an industrial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no.
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to
include only conditions "[connoting] some
deterioration or diminishment in function."
This definition comports with the use of the
word "permanent impairment" at the beginning of amended section 35-1-66, stating,
with our emphasis, that an employee who
receives a "permanent impairment as a result
of an industrial accident ... may receive a
permanent partial disability award." This
wording implies functional "permanent impairment" and does not include asymptomatic
nonratabie conditions.
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the employee subject to his physical condition
when he starts his employment"); see also Terwilliger v. Green Fuel Economizer. Inc.,
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no
apportionment when preexisting condition was
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State
Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r,
294
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment
must be definitely ascertained and rated;
general rule is that apportionment statutes do
not apply when "the prior condition was not
physically disabling").
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned
between the employer and the employee liability for symptoms resulting from one industrial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires
apportionment of liability for aggravation of
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find
that the amendment does more than to clarify
that an employer is free from liability for an
employee's preexisting ratable functional
impairment not caused by the industrial accident. Based on the usage of the term
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and
on Utah case law at the time of the injury,
which allowed full compensation for aggravation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition,
we believe the term "permanent impairment"
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable
physical condition exhibiting some diminished
function. Because Crosiand's back was completely functional prior to the industrial accident and could have continued to be functional absent the accident, we conclude that
apportionment was inappropriate in this case
and that the Commission erroneously failed to
award full compensation for Crosiand's
twenty percent whole person permanent partial
impairment caused by the industrial accident.
We reverse the order of the Industrial Commission
Norman H. J ackson, I udge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, fudge

1. The UAPA governs ail administrative proceedings
commenced after January 1, 1988.
This interpretation is also in line with deci- 2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied
sions in other states, which have allowed for when the terms of the statute leave the specific
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama one permissible reading of the statute. The choice
courts, for example, have refused to require among permissible interpretations might then be
employees to accept reduced compensation for deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexi- would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse
sting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper of the delegated discretion. Morton Int'h 814 P.2d
Co. v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala. at 587-89.
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity" 3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which
compensation for employee with preexisting contributes to the injury must show that his workrelated exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a excess of the normally expected level of nonemplofundamental principle that an employer take[s] yment activity for men and women in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26.
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting j
Cite as
condition, a usual or ordinary exenion suffices to j
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
prove legal cause. Id. (cuing IB Larson, Workmen's \
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That
IN THE
Crosland's exenion in lifting the sign was greater
than normal is undisputed in this case. ConsequeU T A H COURT OF APPEALS
ntly, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen
rule under the amended statute.
Louise D. STROLLO,
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is I
Plaintiff and Appellant,
accomplished by providing the employer contribu- |
v.
tion from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See |
David
STROLLO,
note 6.
Defendant and Appellee.
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines the terms 'impairment" and
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medic- No. 910237-CA
ally impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §35- FILED: March 23, 1992
1-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
""Impairment' is a purely medical condition refle- Third District, Tooele County
cting any anatomical or functional abnormality or Honorable David S. Young
loss/ Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991)
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definit- ATTORNEYS:
ions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's David G. Challed, Salt Lake City, for
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the
Appellant
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on
David
Strollo, Tooele, Appellee Pro Se
the law as it existed at the time of the injury.
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
employer and the Employers* Compensation Fund
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which,
This opinion is subject to revision before
with our emphasis, states in pertinent part,
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
If an employee, who has at least a 10%
whole person permanent impairment
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
from any cause or origin, subsequently
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a
incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse
of the employee's employment, and if
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring
the additional impairment results in
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We
permanent forai disability, the employer
reverse.
or its insurance carrier and the EmploOn February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a
yers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for
complaint
pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse
the payment of benefits as follows:...
This provision thus fully compensates an employee Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11
when an industrial accident and a preexisting imp- (1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex
airment result in permanent total disability, without pane protective order. Plaintiffs pro se
imposing the complete burden of compensation for complaint stated defendant threatened to kill
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of her if she served him with divorce papers.
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the
On February 28, 1991, both parties appeproblems arising when the sum of two injuries is
ared in court without counsel. The judge
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already stated that he had reviewed the complaint
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total seeking a protective order. Before hearing any
disability), without discouraging employers from testimony, the judge stated he was going to
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is com- dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision,
pensated for the permanent total disability, but the the judge continued:
employer is partially compensated from the fund so
I understand that you may be in
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g.,
fear, but this is an improper use of
Hail v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178
the protective order. The protective
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal
order is intended to cover those
connection between the preexisting impairment and |
circumstances where one is in, what
the industrial injury is not required; only that they
we call imminent fear. An imminent
cumulatively result in substantially greater disabifear doesn't mean that you may
lity); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award,
anticipate some future problem. It
the Commission relied upon Nyrehn v. Industrial
means that you are in fear of some
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert,
present problem. That is if there is
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is
an immediate threat. This threat is
misplaced because the Nyrehn case merely apportbased upon your fear that if you
ions between the employer and the fund under this
file divorce papers that you may be
section and does not address the issue of apportioin jeopardy. You have every right
nment between the employer and the employee.
to file divorce papers. You have
every right in that proceeding to
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reverse his conviction under section 7 6 - 8 305 because, as the State concedes, Gardiner was not knowingly interfering with a
peace officer "seeking to effect a lawful
arrest." Since the State fails to establish a
prima facie case under either statute, I see
no need to consider defenses that could
apply.
Finally, and with hindsight, I agree with
the majority's comment that the Court of
Appeals should have published its opinion
in this case. In my view, publication of
appellate opinions serves essentially two
important purposes: It records and disseminates the development of the common
law, 3 and it enables the public to monitor
the quality of appellate judicial service. 4
However, some cases coming before a
court hearing appeals as of right do not
present issues that could enhance the development of the common law, and publication of the greater part of an Appellate
Court's decisions provides an adequate
sampling of Judicial performance. If a
particular case has negligible value as
precedent, the parties are better served by
dispensing with publication and the greater
delay it necessitates.
HOWE, Associate C.J., does not
participate herein.
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

"in ill TON INTERN ATI ON AI
INC., Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF the UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
No. 900325,
Supreme Court of Utah,
June 24, 1991.

made in construction of facilities used in
production of sodium azide pellets and igniter material were not exempt from sales
and use tax. The Supreme Court, Hail,
C.J., held that: (1) materials used in construction of production facilities did not
qualify for exemption from sales and use
tax, and (2) shells of production facilities
were not "equipment" exempt from sales
and use tax.
\ f firmed.
Stewart, J, t concurred in the result.

I \ d in i n i s t r a t i v e 1 a/m a n cl P r o c eel u re
<3=>764
Same standard used for determining
harmfulness of error in appeals from, judicial proceedings applies to review of agency action and under that standard, error
will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that error affected outcome of proceedings, U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
2 4. d m i n i s t rat i > e I <a m a n, cl I ' roc e cl i i re
<s=>781
It is not characterization of issue as
mixed question of fact and law or characterization of issue as question of general
law that is dispositive of determination of
appropriate level of judicial review of agency action; rather, dispositive factor is
whether agency, by virtue of its experience
or expertise, is in a better position than
courts to give effect to regulatory objective
to be achieved.
3 Statutes <3=*219(2)
When legislative intent concerning specific question at issue can be derived
through traditional methods of statutory
construction, agency's interpretation will
be granted no deference and statute will be
interpreted in accord with its legislative
intent. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d).

Taxpayer sought review of determina
tion of Tax Commission that expenditures

4 Statutes <s=>219(l)
Agency's statutory construction should
only be given deference when there is

3.

4.

M. Eisenberg, The Nature of (he Common Law
4-5 (1988).

K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 81 (rev, ed.
1950).
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grant of discretion to agency concerning
language in question, either expressly
made in statute or implied from statutory
language. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>800
Taxation <s=>1222
Tax Commission's interpretation of
statute exempting from sales and use tax
sales and leases of materials, machinery,
equipment, and services in excess of $500,000 used in new construction, expansion, or
modernization of synthetic fuel processing
and upgrading plant did not grant the Commission any discretion; therefore, Commission's decision would be reviewed under
correction of error standard. U.C.A.1953,
59-12-104(15), 63-46b-16(4).
6. Taxation e=>1245
Statute exempting from sales and use
tax sales and leases of materials, machinery, equipment, and services of any person
in excess of $500,000 used in new construction, expansion or modernization of synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plants
was intended to grant exemption for materials used in construction of plant which
removes impurities from natural resources
and did not apply to expenditures made in
construction of facilities used in production
of sodium azide pellets and igniter material. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-104(15).
7. Statutes <®=>193
Under rule of noscitur a sociis, meaning of questionable words and phrases in
statute are to be ascertained by reference
to words or phrases associated with them.

for use in new or expanding operations was
not unreasonable.
U.C.A.1953, 59-12104(16).
10. Taxation <3>1245
Taxpayer failed to establish that prior
agency practice was contrary to Tax Commission's refusing to grant taxpayer exemption from sales and use tax for expenditures made in construction of facilities
used in production of sodium azide pellets
and igniter material and, therefore, statute
providing for judicial relief from agency
action as contrary to agency's prior practice did not apply. U.C.A.1953, 59-12104(15, 16), 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
11. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=701
Taxation e»1319
In the absence of official guideline or
well-established policy, decisions of auditors for Tax Commission do not constitute
"agency practice" for purposes of statute
providing for judicial relief when agency
action is contrary to agency's prior practice. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
12. Taxation <s=>1245
Record supported Tax Commission's
determination that shells of manufacturer's
facilities used in production of sodium azide
pellets and igniter material did not constitute "equipment" exempt from sales and
use tax. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-104(16). 6346b-16(4)(h)(iv).

8. Taxation <3=>204(1)
Tax exemption statutes are to be
strictly construed against party claiming
exemption and all ambiguities are to be
resolved in favor of taxation.

Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Miller,
Richard M. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Morton Intern.
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet. Salt
Lake City, for State Tax Com'n.

9. Taxation «=>1245
Tax Commission's determination that
shells of taxpayer's facilities used in production of sodium azide pellets and igniter
material did not constitute "equipment" under statute exempting from sales and use
tax sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by manufacturer

HALL, Chief Justice:
Petitioner Morton International. Inc.
("Morton"), seeks review of the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission
("the Commission") that certain expenditures made in the construction of facilities
used in the production of sodium azide pel
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ets and igniter material ("production facili;ies") are not exempt from sales and use
ax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15)
)r (16) (Supp.1987).
The facts underlying Morton's claims are
lot in dispute. In 1987, Morton began
construction of facilities used in the proiuction of sodium azide pellets and igniter
naterial, which are components of the
:rash protection airbag system used in moDor vehicles. The pellets and igniter material are inserted into small pressure vessels
to form airbag inflaters. When the pellet
is ignited, it generates nitrogen gas, which
rapidly inflates the airbag. Morton has
manufactured sodium azide pellets for over
a decade. The new facilities, however, constitute a significant expansion of this business.
The process of manufacturing sodium
azide pellets and igniter material is unique
and highly specialized. The chemicals used
in the process are extremely energetic, explosive, and toxic. Accordingly, the facilities were specifically designed to incorporate safety and environmental features and
support specialized and massive equipment,
some of which is suspended above the
floor. For example, separate facilities
were built for each stage of production.
This was done to minimize the risk to personnel, machinery, and equipment in case
of fire, explosion, or chemical contaminant
reactions. There are also many environmental features that are incorporated into
the buildings themselves, such as, heavy
metal free areas, special conductive flooring, protective blast and blowout walls and
ceilings, chemical dust collection filters,
and protected double-walled piping and
sumps. Many of the production areas are
operated by remote control. Personnel
only enter for maintenance and quality control. Due to the toxic nature of the materials, personnel are not allowed in these areas without protective clothing, including
respirators.

the action would be treated as a request
for refund and formal hearing. A hearing
was held on March 7, 1990. At the hearing, Morton represented that since 1987, it
had paid an excess of $325,000 in sales and
use taxes with respect to the construction
of its sodium azide pellet production facilities. Morton contended that it was entitled
to a refund of sales and use taxes pursuant
to section 59-12-104(15) on the ground that
the production facilities were a "synthetic
fuel processing and upgrading plant'' and,
alternatively, pursuant to section 59-12104(16), on the ground that the production
facilities function as, and essentially are,
"equipment." On June 7, 1990, the Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decision determining
that the fuel pellets were not a synthetic
fuel and thus the production facilities did
not qualify for an exemption under section
59-12-104(15). The Commission also determined that Morton's production facilities
were real property and thus the sale of
materials used in construction of the production facilities did not constitute the sale
of equipment under section 59-12-104(16).
On July 27, 1990, Morton filed this petition for review. The general issue before
this court is whether the Commission erred
in concluding that the sale of certain materials used in the construction of Morton's
production facilities is not exempt from
sales and use tax under Utah Code Ann,
§ 59-12-104(15) or (16).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On June 26, 1989, Morton, initiated this
action By stipulation, it was agreed that

A. A d m in is i m t ive Procedu re A ct
The instant case was initiated after January 1, 1988, and the Commission's decision
w as reached following a formal, hearing.
Therefore, the applicable standard of review of the Commission's action is set out
in the Utah Administrative Procedure Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b~16t:I which provides in pertinent part:
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court, of Appeals has

1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987) provides:
"(1) The procedures for agency action, agency
review, and judicial review contained in this

chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency
on and after January I, 1988,"
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jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies
the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
[1] The Commission maintains that section 63-46b-16(4) grants agencies greater
discretion than they had under prior case
law. This argument is based on the language in section 63-46b-16(4) stating that
appellate relief can only be granted if "on
the basis of the agency's record" the appellate court determines that a person has
2.

See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982);
see also Comments of the Utah Administrative
Law Advisory Committee, Utah A.P.A. at 15
(Code Co Law Publishers, April 25, 1988) [hereinafter Advisory Comrr itee].

3. The comments of the Utah Administrative
Law Advisory Committee state that section 6346b-16(4) is patterned after comparable provisions of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("MSAPA"). See Model State Admin.
Procedure Act § 5-116, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981).
Section 5-116 of the MSAPA requires the showing of substantial prejudice for an appellate
court to grant relief. It is clear from reading
the comments to section 5-116 that the requirement of substantial prejudice does not require
appellate courts to grant administrative agencies
deference. Indeed, the comments state that appellate courts "may decide that the agency has
erroneously interpreted the law if the court
merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation."

been "substantially prejudiced." We have
always based our decisions on the agency's
record. Therefore, this requirement does
not disturb prior case law.2 Furthermore,
section 63-46b-16(4) deals with judicial relief, not judicial review. It is clear from
this language that this section does not
affect the degree of deference an appellate
court grants to an agency's decision.3
Rather, section 63-46b-16(4) ensures that
relief should not be granted when, although the agency committed error, the
error was harmless. Indeed, the language
of section 63-46b-16(4) is similar to language in rules of procedure and evidence
dealing with harmless error.4 Given this
similarity in language, we conclude that
the legislature in enacting section 63-46b16(4) intended that the same standard used
for determining the harmfulness of error in
appeals from judicial proceedings should
apply to reviews of agency actions. Under
this standard, an error will be harmless if it
is "sufficiently inconsequential that . . .
there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 5
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h), however, incoirporates standards that appellate
courts are to employ when reviewing allegations of agency error.6 Morton's claims
4. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a);
Utah R.Evid. 103(a).
5. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
In a case such as the instant case, where we
reject the argument that an agency has erred,
this provision has no application.
6. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted
section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h) as establishing standards of review that differ, in some
cases, from our prior case law. See Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 66-68
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (different standard for reviewing agency action based on determination
of fact); see also Advisory Committee at 15;
MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 12730. But see Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of
Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441^2 (Utah Ct.App.
1989) (same standard for applying the law).
We note that the analysis used in Pro-Benefit is
inconsistent with the analysis expressed in this
opinion.
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e based on subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d),
l(h)(iii), and (4)(h)(iv). The question
esented, therefore, is whether the stanird of review incorporated into these subctions differs from the standard of re
ew developed in our prior case law.
B.

Prior Case Law

Prior to the adoption of the Utah Admintrative Procedure Act, the Utah courts
eveloped three levels of review in connecon with agency action. First, agencies'
ndings of fact were granted considerable
eference and would not be disturbed on
ppeal if supported by substantial evience.7 Second, a correction-of-error stanard, giving no deference to agencies' deciions, was used to review agencies' rulings
n issues the court characterized as conerning general law.8 Examples of issues
haracterized as questions of general law
nclude rulings concerning constitutional
[uestions,9 rulings concerning the agency's
urisdiction or statutory authority,10 rulings
f. See, e.g., Savage Indus. Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1991); Hurley
v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah
1988); Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427,
429 (Utah 1986); Big K Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984). See
also section 63^6b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that a
party who is substantially prejudiced by an
agency action can seek judicial relief on the
ground that "the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court."
8. See Savage Indus,, 811 P.2d at 666; Utah Dep't
of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983).
9.

See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Utah Dep't
of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 608; R. W. Jones
Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm n, 649 P.2d 628,
629 (Utah 1982). See also Utah Administrative
Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(a), which
provides that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an agency action may seek judicial
relief on the ground that "the agency action, or
the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied."

10. See, e.g.t Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d
at 608; Utah Cable Television Operator Ass'n v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398, 402-0'

concerning common lawr principles such as
the interpretation of contracts and certificates,11 and rulings concerning interpretation of statutes unrelated to the agency.12
The correction-of-error standard was also
used to review an agency's construction of,
or application of the findings of fact to, the
statutes which the agency is empowered to
administer—when the agency's experience
or expertise is not helpful in resolving the
issue.13 One example of such a situation is
when a question of statutory interpretation
turns on basic legislative intent.14 Other
examples include situations where the
agency is construing ordinary statutory
terms within the statutes which they administer, such as, application of limitation
period under the workers' compensation
act,15 and the proper construction of the
term "deficiency of service." l6 In fact, in
any situation involving the application of
the legal rules to the findings of fact, a
correction-of-error standard is used if the
court is as well-suited to determine the
(Utah 1982). See also Utah Administrative Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(b), which pro- that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an agency action can seek judicial
relief on the ground that "the agency has acted
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute."
11. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at
608; W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3
Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1954). But
see Savage Bros. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (interpretation
of certificate of public convenience granted deference when agency's expertise is helpful in
interpreting ambiguous and technical terms).
12. See generally Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429. Both cases state that no
deference is granted to an agency's interpretation of statutes or application of statutory terms
to factual situations unless the agency, by virtue
of its expertise, is in a better position to give
effect to the regulatory objective.
13. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett,
726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
14. See Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Big K Corp., 689
P.2d at 1353.
15. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692
P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1984).
-•

Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
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issue as the agency.17
Finally, an intermediate standard of review, granting some deference to the agency's decisions, has been used when the
agency's experience or expertise puts the
agency in a better position to resolve issues
concerning the application of findings of
fact to the legal rules governing the case
and the interpretations of the operative
provisions of the statutes the agency is
empowered to administer.18 This standard
was also used when it was alleged that the
agency abused the discretion granted to it
by statute.19 Under the intermediate standard of review, appellate courts did not
disturb an agency's decision if the decision
was within the bounds of reasonableness.20
In cases not involving discretion, it has
not always been clear when the intermediate standard of review should be used.21
In some early cases, we characterized the
issues that are appropriate for the intermediate standard of review as questions of
mixed fact and law 22 or, alternatively, as
questions concerning the application of the
law.23 However, issues that are appropriate for the intermediate standard have also
17. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett,
lit P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353.
18. See, e.g„ Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional Hosp. v.
Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah
1986); Savage Bros. Inc., 723 P.2d at 1087; Barney v. Department of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d
1273, 1275 (Utah 1984).
19. See, e.g., Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment
Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982).
20. See, e.g., Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional Hosp., 723
P.2d at 428-29; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658
P.2d at 610.
21. See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666. Compare
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (correction-of-error
standard used to review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee") with Pinter
Constr. Corp. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah
1984) (intermediate standard used to review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee").
22. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional Hosp., 723 P.2d at 429; Gray v. Department of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 807, 810
(Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658
P.2d at 610.

been described as questions of statutory
construction,24 questions of special law,25
and questions of law.26 Indeed, we have
stated, "An agency's interpretation of key
provisions of the statute that it is empowered to administer is often inseparable
from its application of the rules of law to
the basic facts." 27
[2] A review of our recent cases, however, makes it clear that it is not the characterization of an issue as a mixed question
of fact and law or the characterization of
the issue as a question of general law that
is dispositive of the determination of the
appropriate level of judicial review. Rather, what has developed as the dispositive
factor is whether the agency, by virtue of
its experience or expertise, is in a better
position than the courts to give effect to
the regulatory objective to be achieved.28
We have stated:
We do not defer to the Commission when
construing statutory terms or when applying statutory terms to the facts unless the construction of the statutory lan23. Mixed questions of fact and law have been
defined as "'the "application" of the findings of
basic fact (e.g., what happened) to the legal
rules governing the case.'" Gray, 681 P.2d at
811 n. 7 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.,
658 P.2d at 610). This court has used the terms
mixed question of fact and law and application
of the law interchangeably. See Hurley, 767
P.2d at 527-28; Logan Regional Hosp., 723 P.2d
at 429; Barney, 681 P.2d at 1275; Clearfield City
v. Department of Employment Sec, 663 P.2d
440, 443-44 (Utah 1983).
24. See Chris & Dick's v. State Tax Comm'n, 791
P.2d 511, 513-14 (Utah 1990); Bennett, 726 P.2d
at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Utah
Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610.
25. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at
610.
26. See Chris & Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hur
ley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 42Q;
Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Utah Dep i of
Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610.
27.

Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610

28. Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Chris <£
Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley, 767 P 2d at
527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp.. 68Q
P.2d at 1353.
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guage or the application of the law to the
facts should be subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, first-hand experience with
the subject matter.29
A clear example of this principle can be
seen in Savage Brothers Inc. v. Public
Service Commission.20 There, we noted
that questions involving interpretations of
certificates of public convenience and necessity ordinarily involve questions of general law. However, we held that when an
agency has specialized knowledge that is
helpful in interpreting ambiguous and technical terms of a certificate, an intermediate
standard of review is appropriate.31
In determining whether the standards of
review incorporated in subsections 63-46b16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii), and (4)(h)(iv) differ from
the standards established in our prior case
law, we will address each section separately in the context of the claim raised under
that section.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d)
Morton's claim that it is entitled to judicial relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is
based on the allegation that the Commission erred in its construction of Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) and (16) or in its application of these subsections to the findings of fact. Under our prior case law, the
standard used to review the Commission's
determinations would be a correction-of-er29.

Bennett,

726 P.2d at 429.

JO.

723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986).

51.

Id. at 1087.

52.

811 P.2d 664, 668-671 (Utah 1991).

53.

Id. at 668.

54.

Id. at 670.

55. Id at 670 (citing MSAPA § 5-116, c o m m e n t s ,
15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981)).
56. The legislative history of section 6 3 - 4 6 b 16(4)(d) also supports this position. The comments of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act
state that section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is patterned
after comparable provisions in the MSAPA.
The c o m m e n t s to the relevant section of the
MSAPA state that "the enabling statute normally

ror standard unless the Commission was
granted some discretion in dealing with the
issue or, by virtue of its expertise or experience, was in a superior position to decide
the issue. The first question presented,
therefore, is whether section 63-46b-16(4)
departs from this standard.
It has already been established that in
some situations, the standard of review
provided in section 63—46b—16(4)(d) is identical to the standard of review in our prior
case law. In Savage Industries Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Commission*2 we held
that under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a correction-of-error standard, giving no deference to the agency decisions, is to be used
in cases involving statutory construction
where the court is in as good a position as
the agency to interpret the statute.33 This
holding was based on the term "erroneous," which connotes a correction-of-error
standard,34 and the legislative history of
section 63-46b-16(4)(d), which implies that
" 'a court may decide that the agency has
erroneously interpreted the law if the court
merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation.' " 3 5 Similarly, section 63-46b16(4)(h)(i) provides for judicial relief in
cases where the agency has abused the
"discretion delegated to the agency by statute." 36 In past cases, we have held that
an agency has abused its discretion when
the agency's action, viewed in the context
of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable.37
confers s o m e discretion upon the agency. Accordingly, a court should find reversible error
in the agency's application of the law only if the
agency has improperly exercised its discretion."
See MSAPA § 5-116, c o m m e n t s , 15 U.L.A. at
128.
37. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department
of
Employment
Sec, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah
1982); West Jordan v. Department
of Employment Sec, 656 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1982); cf.
Utah Dep't of Admin.
Serv. v. Public
Serv.
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983). Focusing on the legislative grant of authority is
important in determining whether an agency
has abused its discretion. The court should be
careful not to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the agency w h e n considering the
w i s d o m of the agency's policies. See Advisory
Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981).
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Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory construction, the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act does not change the standard of review when the court is in as good
a position as the agency to determine the
issue or when the agency has been granted
discretion in interpreting the statute.
However, nothing in the language of section 63-46b-16 or its legislative history
suggests that an agency's decision is entitled to deference solely on the basis of
agency expertise or experience. Indeed,
there is no reference to agency expertise or
experience in the statute or the statute's
legislative history. Rather, in granting judicial relief when an "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law," the
language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly
indicates that absent a grant of discretion,
a correction-of-error standard is used in
reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.38 Therefore,
to the extent that our cases can be read as
granting deference to an agency's decisions
based solely on the agency's expertise and
not on a statutory delegation of authority,
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) constitutes a
break from prior law.39

The legislature, in many instances, has
explicitly granted agencies discretion in
dealing with specific statutory terms.40
Apart from such explicit grants of authority, courts have also recognized that grants
of discretion may be implied from the statutory language. For example, we have
held that when the operative terms of a
statute are broad and generalized, these
terms "bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to the responsible
agency." 4]l We have also granted an agency's statutory interpretation deference
when the statutory language suggested
that the legislature had left the specific
question at issue unresolved. In Salt Lake
City Corp. v. Confer,*2 we held that an
agency's interpretation of statutory provisions is entitled to deference when there is
more than one permissible reading of the
statute and no basis in the statutory language or the legislative history to prefer
one interpretation over another.43

This, however, may not have a significant effect on the standard used to review
agencies' statutory interpretations and applications of their own statutes. In many
cases where we would summarily grant an
agency deference on the basis of its exper-

[3] The approach used in Salt Lake
City Corp. is consistent with section 6346b-16. Questions of legislative intent are
considered questions of law, which are reviewed for correctness under our prior case

38. As noted supra in notes 21-27 and accompanying text, in some of our earlier cases, in
determining that an intermediate standard of
review is appropriate, we have relied upon the
characterization of an issue as an application of
the law as opposed to an interpretation of the
law. Although in our more recent cases the
focus has turned to agency expertise, the fact
that the Administrative Procedure Act incorporates the terms "application of the law" and
"interpretation of the law" under a single standard supports the contention that absent a grant
of discretion, an agency's interpretation or application of statutory terms should be reviewed
for error.
39. In fact, the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act suggests that the legislature intended to alter the approach the courts
developed to review agency action. See Sullivan, Overview of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah A.P.A. at 4-5 (Code Co Publishers July 8, 1988).

tise, it is also appropriate to grant the
agency deference on the basis of an explicit
or implicit grant of discretion contained in
the governing statute.

40. For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides
for "sales or leases of machinery and equipment
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use
in new or expanding operations (excluding normal operating replacements . . . as determined
by the commission )." (Emphasis added.)
41. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610;
see also Salt Lake City Corp., 657 P.2d at 131617 (term "equity and good conscience" confers
broad discretion).
42.

674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).

43. Id. at 636. The United States Supreme Court
has recently adopted a similar approach. See
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S.
26,
, 110 S.Ct. 929, 938, 108 L.Ed.2d 23
(1990); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841, 104 S.Ct. 2778,
2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
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tw44 and section 63-46b-16(4)(d). There)re, when a legislative intent concerning
le specific question at issue can be derived
irough traditional methods of statutory
instruction, the agency's interpretation
ill be granted no deference and the statte will be interpreted in accord with its
(gislative intent.45 However, in the ab>nce of a discernible legislative intent con*rning the specific question in issue, a
fioice among permissible interpretations of
statute is largely a policy determination,
he agency that has been granted authorii to administer the statute is the approprite body to make such a determination.46
ideed, both the legislative history to seeon 63-46b-16 47 and our prior cases 48 sugest that an appellate court should not
ibstitute its judgment for the agency's
idgment concerning the wisdom of the
gency's policy. When there is no discernile legislative intent concerning a specific
sue the legislature has, in effect, left the
sue unresolved. In such a case, it is
ppropriate to conclude that the legislature
as delegated authority to the agency to
ecide the issue. Such an approach is parcularly appropriate when it is reasonable
) assume that the legislature intended the
gency to have some discretion in dealing
ith the statutory provision at issue.
[4] We do not mean to suggest that
lese are the only methods of determining
r
hether the legislature has granted the
gency discretion in dealing with an issue,
[owever, it is clear from the wording of
ection 63-46b-16 that an agency's statuary construction should only be given defrence when there is a grant of discretion
D the agency concerning the language in
uestion, either expressly made in the statte or implied from the statutory language.
*. See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666, 670; Hurfey v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah
1988).
5. See Savage Indus, at 670; Hurley, 767 P.2d at
527.
6. See Salt Lake City Corp., 674 P.2d at 636;
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611.

B. Section 59-12-104(15)
Morton's first argument is that the sale
of certain materials, machinery, and equipment used in the construction of its production facilities is exempt from sales and use
tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15),
which provides:
The following sales and uses are exempt
from taxes imposed by this chapter:
(15) sales or leases of materials, machinery, equipment, and services of any
person in excess of $500,000 for any tax
year used in the new construction, expansion, or modernization (excluding normal
operating replacements as determined by
the commission) of any mine, mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery (except oil
and gas refineries), synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant, rolling
mill, coal washing plant, or melting facility in Utah commencing after July 1,
1984, and ending June 30, 1989.49
Morton argues that the sodium azide pellets are synthetic fuels and that, therefore,
Morton's facilities constitute a "synthetic
fuel processing and upgrading plant" as
that term is used in section 59-12-104(15).
[5] The question presented is one of
statutory construction or application, and
absent a grant of discretion, the Commission's decision will be reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard. The statutory terms in question are of a specific
nature and do not connote a general grant
of discretion. Furthermore, the precise issue presented, whether facilities such as
those in question can be considered synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
plants, can be resolved through the use of
traditional rules of statutory construction.50 It is apparent that the Commission
has not been granted any discretion in re47. See Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128.
48. See Salt Lake City Corp., 674 P.2d at 636;
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611.
49. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (emphasis
added).
50. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.

590

Utah

814 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

gard to the present issue. Therefore, its
interpretation will not be given deference.
[6] Morton's interpretation of section
59-12-104(15) is based on the well-established rule of statutory construction that a
statutory term should be interpreted and
applied according to its usually accepted
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of
the term results in an application that is
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable,
nor in blatant contradiction of the express
purpose of the statute. 51 It is argued that
the usual meaning of the term "synthetic,"
as defined by Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary, is "relating to or involving
synthesis; produced artificially; manmade." The usual meaning of the term
"fuel," according to Webster's, is a "material used to produce heat or power by burning." Morton then combines these definitions to produce an interpretation of the
term "synthetic fuel" as "a man-made fuel
that could be combusted or consumed to
produce heat or light." Under such an
interpretation of section 59-12-104(15), the
sodium azide pellets would qualify as a
synthetic fuel.
While the analysis used in reaching this
point ignores other relevant and well-established rules of statutory construction, it is
not necessary to rely on other rules of
construction to conclude that Morton's interpretation is erroneous. This is because
the rule cited for Morton's interpretation
does not support its position. First, it is
apparent from the record that there is no
usual and accepted meaning of the term
"synthetic fuel." Testimony at the hearing
established that there is conflict within the
scientific community concerning the accepted meaning of the term. Indeed, in several
points in its brief, Morton claims that there
is confusion concerning the accepted meaning of the term "synthetic fuel." Though
we have relied on dictionary definitions to
determine the usual meaning of statutory
terms, the term "synthetic fuel" is not de51. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446
(Utah 1982); see also Board of Educ. of Granite
School Dist. v. Salt Lake City, 659 P.2d 1030,
1035 (Utah 1983); Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20
Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967).

fined in the dictionary. When it is admitted that there is no accepted meaning of
the statutory term at issue, a method of
construction which is based solely on one of
many possible definitions is inappropriate.
Second, even assuming that Morton's
definition is appropriate, the argument necessarily fails because Morton misapplies
the rule. Morton argues that despite the
confusion as to the meaning of "synthetic
fuel," the term should be defined by combining the strict dictionary definitions of
"synthetic" and "fuel." Under such a definition, any man-made material capable of
burning would qualify as a synthetic fuel.
Taking Morton's analysis one step further,
any facility that produces a material capable of burning would qualify as a "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant."
Morton attempts to avoid such a result by
arguing that a requirement not found in
the definition of either "synthetic" or
"fuel"—the requirement that it must be
economical to produce heat or energy from
a man-made material—should be read into
the definition of "synthetic fuel." Morton
claims that such an interpretation is justified in order to avoid absurd results. This
argument, however, is a misstatement of
the very rule upon which Morton relies.
When the use of an ordinary meaning of a
statutory term results in a statute that is
"confused beyond reason," 52 the court
does not resolve the confusion by modifying the ordinary meaning of the term.
Rather, in such cases the method of construction urged by Morton is not employed.53
[7] However, other methods of construction can be used to determine the application of the phrase "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant" when the
meaning of the phrase cannot be arrived at
through use of the usual meaning of the
term. One such method of statutory construction is the rule of noscitur a sociis,
which provides that the meaning of ques52.

Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.

53. See Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist.,
659 P.2d at 1035; Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446;
Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.
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ionable words and phrases in a statute be
iseertained by reference to words or phrass associated with them.54 The terms surounding "synthetic fuel processing and
ipgrading plant" all relate to different aspects of the mining or material reclamation
perations. This suggests that the term
synthetic fuel processing and upgrading
lant" should be interpreted in accordance
r
ith the term's relationship to the mining
ldustry. Such an approach is also consistnt with the legislative history of section
9-12-104(15). Both Morton and the Comlission assert that the legislative history
?veals that section 59-12-104(15) was en:ted to aid Utah's ailing mining industry.

tion 59-12-104(15). Because the definition
offered by Dr. Wiser focuses on "processing and upgrading plant" as well as "synthetic fuel," it is also consistent with the
rule of statutory construction which provides that terms of a statute are to be
interpreted as a comprehensive whole and
not in a piecemeal fashion.55 It should also
be noted that this narrow definition limits
the exception granted under section 59-12104(15). Therefore, the approach suggested by Dr. Wiser is consistent with the
well-established principle that tax exemption statutes are to be strictly construed
against the party claiming the exemption
and all ambiguities are to be resolved in
favor of taxation.56
At the hearing, Dr. Wiser, a professor of
There is ample support from the wording
lei engineering at the University of Utah,
r
of
the statute, the statute's legislative hisfered a definition of "synthetic fuel protory,
and other methods of statutory conissing and upgrading plant" that is construction
to conclude that the legislature,
stent with the language and legislative
story of section 59-12-104(15). Dr. Wis- in enacting section 59-12-104(15), intended
stated that in the synthetic fuel indus- to grant an exemption for materials used in
yf the term "synthetic fuel processing the construction of the type of plant Dr.
id upgrading plant" refers to a plant Wiser described: that is, a plant which
lich produces a liquid material that can removes impurities from natural resources
further refined into a synthetic fuel by such as coal, oil shale, and tar sands to
produce a liquid or gaseous material meant
moving the impurities from raw materito be used in combustion for the production
> other than petroleum and natural gas,
of energy. It is also clear that given this
ch as coal, tar sands, oil shale, and orconstruction, Morton's production facilities
nic waste. Dr. Wiser further testified
do not qualify as a synthetic fuel processit a synthetic fuel is a liquid or gaseous
ing and upgrading plant. The Commission,
iterial produced from such raw materials
therefore, did not err in determining that
3d in combustion primarily for the prothe materials used in the construction of
ction of energy. The requirement that a
Morton's facilities do not qualify for an
ithetic fuel be gaseous or liquid is linked
exemption under section 59-12-104(15).
the purpose of developing synthetic fu, which is to take the pressure off of
C. Section 59-12-10MW
.roleum and natural gas and to reduce
[9] Morton argues that the shells of its
)endence on foreign oil.
production facilities, i.e., the foundations,
8] This definition, to the extent that it walls, floors, and ceilings, constitute equipuses on mined materials such as coal, ment. Therefore, the construction of the
sands, and oil shale, is consistent with facilities constitutes a purchase of equiplanguage and legislative history of sec- ment under 59-12-104(16), which provides:
See Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368. 374
2d 839, 840 (1962); W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public
irv. Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, 812
954); Perris v. Perris, 115 Utah 128, 202 P.2d
H, 733 (1949); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at
,
10 S.Ct. at 935.
Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045
Jtah 1991); Peay v. Board of Educ. of Provo

City Schools, 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 P.2d 490, 492
(1962).
56. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980); Great
Salt Lake Minerals v. State Tax Comm'n, 573
P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake County v.
Tax Comm'n, Utah ex rei Good Shepherd Lutheran Church, 548 P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976).
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The following sales and uses are exempt
from taxes imposed by the chapter:
(16) sales or leases of machinery and
equipment purchased or leased by a
manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and equipment even
though they may increase plant production or capacity, as determined by the
commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah.57
Morton's argument is based on the assertion that the shells of its production facilities function as equipment by preventing,
localizing, and directing accidental explosions, preventing toxic exposure to workers
and the environment, providing structural
support for specialized pieces of machinery,
and providing access to machinery. The
Commission rejected this argument, determining that the facilities constitute real
property not subject to an exemption under
section 59-12-104(16).
The specific issue presented on appeal,
therefore, is whether the term "equipment," as used in section 59-12-104(16),
refers to structures that have characteristics of improvements to real property, but
also have characteristics of equipment in
that they provide safety features, support
for machinery, and access to machinery.
This is a question of statutory construction
or application and absent a grant of discretion, the Commission's decision will be reviewed for correctness.58
There is no explicit grant of authority
regarding the question of what constitutes
"equipment" under section 59-12-104(16).
It is also true that the precise question at
issue cannot be resolved using traditional
57. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis
added).
58. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).
59. See Webster's New Third International Dictionary 768 (14th ed. 1961).
60. The legislative history of section 59-12104(16) suggests that the section was enacted to
provide incentives for the expansion of manufacturing plants. Morton claims that since the
act was meant to provide incentives to manufac-

methods of statutory construction. The
usual meaning of the term "equipment" is
fixed assets of a business enterprise not
including real property and buildings.59
This, however, does not resolve the issue.
Morton does not claim that buildings
should qualify as an exemption under section 59-12-104(16). Rather, Morton's argument is that the shells of its production
facilities are so specialized and so intricately connected to the function of the machinery that they do not constitute buildings, in
the traditional sense, but are essentially
equipment. The other terms of the statute
are not helpful, and the legislative history
is not, as in the case of section 59-12104(15), specific enough to provide much
guidance,60
Indeed, it seems that the legislature left
unresolved the more general question of
whether structures having characteristics
of real property as well as characteristics
of equipment can qualify for an exemption
under section 59-12-104(16), let alone the
more specific issue asserted in this appeal.
It should also be noted that the classification of a structure as real property or
equipment is the type of determination the
Commission routinely performs. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the legislature
granted the Commission discretion in this
area. Given these facts, we conclude that
the Commission has been granted discretion in interpreting the term "equipment."
The decision of the Commission, therefore,
will only be overturned if it is unreasonable.61
In determining whether the Commission's decision is reasonable, it must be
noted that the Commission has promulgated a rule that expressly excludes real
property and improvements to real property from the definition of equipment, as that
turers, the term "equipment" should be given an
expansive interpretation; such an assertion is
controverted by the rule that tax exemption
statutes are to be strictly construed. See Parson
Asphalt Prods. Inc., 617 P.2d at 398; Great Suit
Lake Minerals, 573 P.2d at 340; Salt Lake County, 548 P.2d at 631.
61. See supra notes 36-39 and accompan\ing
text.
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rm is used in section 59-12-104(16).
uie 865-19-85S provides:
2. "Equipment" means any independent device separated from any machinery but essential to an integrated or continuous manufacturing or assembling
process or any sub unit thereof....

statutes that are similar to rule 865-1985S, that is, tax statutes granting exemptions for machinery and equipment but not
for building or building structures.66 Implicit in Morton's argument is the assertion
that under a functional analysis, the facilities in question would qualify as equipment.

B. Application of Exemption:
1. The machinery and equipment exemption applies only to tangible personal
property. It does not apply to real property or to tangible personal property
which is purchased and becomes an improvement to real property,
[orton does not challenge the propriety of
ale 865-19-85S. In fact, Morton's argulent relies heavily on the language of the
ule.62
Morton argues that because the term
equipment" is not defined in the tax code
r Utah case law, this court should look to
ther jurisdictions for guidance. Specifially, Morton cites cases from Wisconsin63
nd the federal bench64 that have focused
n the function that the particular strucure performs in determining if the strucure should be considered equipment.65 It
3 argued that we should adopt this apiroach because it was developed under

There are, however, many difficulties
with Morton's argument. It is rule 86519-85S, not section 59-12-104(16), that is
similar to the statutes cited by Morton.
Yet Morton has cited no cases where this
court has looked to another jurisdiction's
statutes to aid in the interpretation of an
agency's rule. In situations like the instant case, where the Commission has been
granted discretion to interpret the term
"equipment" and therefore discretion in interpreting rule 865-19-85S,67 other jurisdictions' rulings are not as salient as they
may be in situations dealing with strict
statutory
construction.
Furthermore,
though there are similarities between rule
865-19-85S and the statutes Morton cites,
the statutes and rule 865-19-85S are not
identical. None of the statutes upon which
Morton relies involve sales and use tax.
Moreover, under rule 865-19-85S, the tax
exemption does not apply to real property
and improvements to real property, while

»2. Because Morton asserts that the Commission
erred in interpreting section 59-12-104(16), the
Commissions determination must be reviewed
under section 64-46b-16(4)(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Morton's argument,
however, relies more on the wording of rule
865-19-85S than on the language of section 5912-104(16). The instant case, therefore, may
present a situation more appropriately reviewed
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the Administrative Procedure Act, i.e., the agency's action
is "contrary to a rule of the agency," rather than
under section 64-46b-16(4)(d). Morton has not
asserted this claim. In any event, since we have
already held that the Commission has been
granted discretion in interpreting the term
"equipment," as used in section 59-12-104(16),
and rule 865-19-85S defines the term at issue, it
is clear that in this case a reasonableness standard should be used under either section of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See supra notes
18-20, 36-37, and accompanying text. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v.
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982); Utah
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 151
P.2d 467, 470 (1944).

63. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125
Wis.2d 437, 373 N.W.2d 680, 687-89 (Ct.App.
1985); Ladish Malting Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Revenue, 98 Wis.2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56, 62
(Ct.App. 1980).
64. Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
508 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1974).
65. Morton asserts that under the functional
analysis the determination of whether property
is equipment or real property is made using a
three-step approach: first, annexation (how is
the property attached?); second, adaptation
(what is the function or purpose of the property?); and third, intent (did the owner intend the
property to remain tangible personal property
permanently attached to real estate, or did the
owner intend the property to be real property?).
66. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing
Co., 373 N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297
N.W.2d at 56.
67. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren, 645 P.2d at 633; Utah Hotel Co., 151 P.2d
at 470.
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under the statutes Morton cites the tax
exemption does not apply to the arguably
narrower term of buildings and building
structures.68
We also note that the case law from
other jurisdictions is at best conflicting in
this area.69 There are jurisdictions that
have not followed a functional approach in
interpreting similar statutes. 70 Furthermore, the jurisdictions that have adopted a
functional approach have reached conflicting conclusions.71 Therefore, even if we
held that section 59-12-104(16) contemplates a functional approach in determining
whether a structure was equipment or real
property, it would not necessarily follow
that Morton's facilities would constitute
equipment. It was established at the hearing that the functional analysis urged by
Morton is often "very nebulous." Indeed,
it is entirely possible that the Commission
agreed with Morton's approach but disagreed with Morton's conclusion.
Given the language of rule 865-19-85S,
the discrepancies between rule 865-19-85S
and the statutes Morton cites, and the conflicting case law, the Commission's determination that the shells of Morton's facilities do not constitute equipment is not unreasonable. Therefore, the Commission's
determination will not be disturbed.

Ill.

SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)

[10] Morton also claims that it is entitled to relief under section 63-46b16(4)(h)(iii), which provides for judicial relief when the "agency action is . . . contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless
the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate
a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency." Neither Morton nor the Commission
has cited any case law relating to section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Indeed, it appears that
there is no Utah case law that follows an
approach analogous to the approach set out
in this section. Moreover, the legislative
history concerning this section is confused
and therefore not helpful in interpreting
the section.72 Given these facts, we do not
engage in an in-depth analysis of the section.
Morton claims that the Commission, in
determining that the shells of its production facilities are real property, took action
that was contrary to its prior practice of
characterizing similar structures as tangible personal property. This allegation is
based on the testimony of Mr. Anderson,
an auditor who had formerly worked for
the tax Commission who testified that he
was aware of various instances where

68. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing
Co., 373 N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297
N.W.2d at 56.

missioner of Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272, 274
(Minn. 1983) (metal canopy over gasoline pumps
does not constitute equipment).

69. The Commission cites several cases which
define the term "real property." Under these
definitions, it is clear that Morton's facilities
would qualify as real property. Thus, they
would not qualify for an exemption under rule
865-19-85S. See National Lead Co. v. Borough
of Sayerville, 132 N.J.Super. 30, 331 A.2d 633.
637 (1975); Strobel v. Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins.,
152 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D.1967); In re Inglis, 69
Okla. 64, 169 P. 1083, 1084 (1917); Sanchez v.
Brandt, 567 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. 1978).

72. The comments of the Utah Administrative
Law Advisory Committee state that section 6346b-16(4)(h)(iii) is patterned after section 5116(8)(iii) of the MSAPA. See Advisory Committee at 15. The comment to section 5116(8)(iii) provides that section 5-116(8)(iii) is
related to section 2-103, which requires agencies to make an index of their final orders and
to make this index available for public inspection and copying. Under the MSAPA's scheme,
a "party may invoke the indexing and public
access requirement of Section 2-102, for the
purpose of ascertaining the agency's prior practice, so as to reveal the inconsistency between
the challenged agency action and prior agency
practice." See MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15
U.L.A. at 129. Utah, however, has not enacted a
provision similar to section 2-102. Due to the
conflict between this legislative history and
Utah's statutory scheme, legislative history cannot be relied on to a great extent in interpreting
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).

70. See Green Circle Growers Inc. v. Lorain County BdL of Revision, 35 Ohio St.3d 38, 517 N.E.2d
899, 900 (1988).
71. Compare Thirup, 508 F.2d at 920 (under
functional approach, greenhouse constitutes
equipment) with Busch v. County of Hennepin,
380 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn.1986) (under functional approach greenhouse does not constitute
equipment). See also Crown Coco Inc. v. Corn-
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walls, flooring, and roofs of automatic storage facilities and large oil storage tanks
were treated as tangible personal property.
The Commission, in determining that the
facilities in question are real property, did
not distinguish the instant case from situations involving automatic storage facilities
or oil storage tanks. The question presented, therefore, is whether Mr. Anderson's
testimony establishes prior inconsistent
agency practice for the purpose of section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). If the testimony establishes prior inconsistent agency practice,
Morton would be entitled to relief under
this section due to the Commission's failure
to provide a "rational basis for the inconsistency."
In approaching this issue, it is important
to note the exact nature of the evidence
presented at the hearing. Mr. Anderson
did not testify that the Commission, in a
formal or informal hearing, classified oil
storage tanks and automatic storage facilities as tangible personal property. Rather,
it is apparent from the record that Mr.
Anderson was referring to individual audits.73 Indeed, he testified that the method
used in determining that the tanks and
storage facilities were tangible personal
property was "not an official guideline."
Furthermore, the auditing division did not
consistently classify such structures as
equipment, but also classified such structures as real property. This inconsistency
was due to the fact that there was no
well-established policy regarding the classification of these structures.

wise would be to bind the Commission by
the unappealed decisions of its subordinates. It is the Commission that has
been granted authority to administer the
tax code.76 Morton has provided no evidence that the Commission itself has acted
contrary to the position it has taken in the
instant case. Under Morton's approach,
the mere fact that there is conflict within
an agency on a particular question would
be sufficient to justify judicial relief under
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Due to the
presence of a conflict, no matter how the
issue is finally resolved, the decision will be
inconsistent with some of the decisions of
the agency's lower level employees. In
recognizing the Commission's authority to
administer the tax code, section 63-46b-16
recognizes the Commission's authority over
its own employees. Since Morton failed to
establish prior agency practice contrary to
the agency's action, the Commission's determination cannot be overturned on the
basis of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
IV. SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)
[12] Morton's remaining contention is
that the Commission's determination that
the shells of its production facilities do not
constitute equipment is not supported by
the record and is therefore arbitrary and
capricious. It is argued that for this reason Morton is entitled to relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).77 However, an
analysis of the section is unnecessary because it is clear that the record supports
the Commission's determination.

[11] Although there is limited law on
point,74 it is clear that in the absence of an
official guideline or a well-established policy, the decisions of auditors do not constitute "agency practice" for the purpose of
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).75 To hold other-

It is argued that because Morton produced a witness who testified that in his opinion the shells of the facilities in question
constituted equipment and no other witness
contradicted this testimony, the Commission is not free to disagree with this opin-

73. Although it is not clear, it appears from the
record that the classification of these structures
as tangible personable property occurred in audits concerning Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103,
not Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16).

ic storage facilities as tangible personal property
is inconsistent with the classification of shells of
Morton's facilities as real property.

74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. It may be important to note that we are not
deciding whether the classification of oil storage
tanks and walls, ceilings, and floors of automat-

76. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-201 to
-210.
77. Section 63-^6b-16(4)(h)(iv) provides for judicial relief when an agency's actions are "otherwise arbitrary or capricious."
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ion. Morton's witness formed his opinion
by applying his interpretation of rule 86519-85S and section 59-12-104(16) to the
undisputed facts. Since the facts are indeed undisputed, his opinion is simply a
legal conclusion. While the Commission is
not free to make findings of fact outside
the scope of the evidence presented at the
hearing,78 the Commission is free to disagree with the legal conclusions offered by
witnesses, even when those conclusions are
uncontroverted. It is undisputed that sufficient factual evidence was presented at
the hearing, and it has been established
that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in dealing with section 59-12104(16). The Commission's decision, therefore, is supported by the record.
For the reasons stated above, we hold
that the Commission did not err in determining that expenditures made in the construction of Morton's sodium azide pellets
facilities do not qualify for an exemption
under section 59-12-104(15) and (16).
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Josafat TRUJILLO-MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of
Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1) guilty
plea colloquy as well as defendant's affidavit regarding plea bargain were required to
be considered in concert in determining
whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to plea; (2) defendant's
testimony at guilty plea colloquy, together
with testimony of his attorney at hearing
to withdraw the plea, established that defendant understood plea bargain affidavit
when he signed it; and (3) trial court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to question defendant at guilty plea colloquy about
defendant's understanding of nature and
elements of his charge, or whether he understood minimum and maximum sentences
which could be imposed.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=»1149
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial
court's determination that defendant has
failed to show good cause for withdrawal
of guilty plea unless it clearly appears that
trial court abused its discretion.
2. Criminal Law <s=>274(2, 3)
It is abuse of discretion to refuse to
allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea
which was not made in strict compliance
with rule governing acceptance of guilty
pleas. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed).
3. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(5)
Guilty plea colloquy as well as defendant's affidavit regarding plea bargain
were required to be considered in concert in
determining whether defendant knowingly
and voluntarily consented to plea. U.C.A.
1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed).

Defendant appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., denying his motion to

4. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(5)
Defendant's testimony at guilty plea
colloquy, together with testimony of his
attorney at hearing to withdraw the plea,
established that defendant understood plea
bargain affidavit when he signed it; defendant testified that he understood he was
pleading guilty by signing affidavit and
that he wished to sign it, and attorney

78. First Natl Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of

Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 19Q0)

No. 900464-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 7, 1991.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAM

vs.

AST) ORDER

YODHG KU2CT2IC SIGH COMPANY
and/or SMITH AOMTHTSTEATOKS,
Defendants *
5: *

*

HEAEING:

Hearing Sooa 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
Sast 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 28,
1990 at 10:00 o* clock a.m- Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission,

BEFORE:

Barbara.Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge..

APEKAT?ANCES:

The applicant was present
Vir&inius Dabney, Attorney.

and

was

represented

by

The defendants were represented by J. Angus Edwards,
Attorney,

The. .applicant, in.fcfclgmatte.r is claiming additional compensation
benefits ***«* -n****-^! expenses in relation to a February 9T 1989" industrial
back injury. The defendants have contested the relatedness and necessity of
*•>><* fusion surgery that has been recommended by the applicant's treating
physician, Dr- N- H o m e . Due to conflicting TnediraT opinions with respect to
fr/h* treatment recommended for the applicant's industrial injury, the matter
was referred to a Tragical panel cm April 17, 1990. The medical panel report
was received at the Industrial Commission on June 8, 1990 and was distributed
to the parties on June 21, 1990. On July 9, 1990, counsel for the applicant
submitted a letter commenting on how he interpreted the medical panel, report.
Counsel for the defendants filed a response on July 17, 1990 • On July 20,
1990 counsel for the applicant replied and requested clarification be obtained
from the medical panel regarding whether the applicant's pre-etfisting
condition was symptomatic or not* It has been determined that there is no
need to obtain mf^l^*1 panel clarification and as thefflpriiralpanel report Is
well supported, it is adopted by the Administrative Law Judge.

G

m

ORDER
SB: GAST CSOSLASD
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 28 years old on the date of injury
and was then* and is now, single with no dependents. At the time of his
injury, the applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning a wage of
$10*17 per hour.
The applicants position was that of a sheet metal
fabricator and welder. On the morning of the date of injury, February 9,
1989, - the applicant and another employee, James Brown, were moving a sign
weighing approximately 200 pounds over to the. paint booth so that it could be
painted. The applicant estimated the dimensions of the sign to he twelve feet
by thcee feet. The sign was made of sheet metal and angle iron. The angle
iron stuck out from the end of the sign and fh* applicant was holding onto
this angle iron to carry the sign. He had his hgnd? palm up and about
shoulder width apart as he carried the sign. He was walking forward with the
sign when he came to a corner which required some maneuvering. It was

rtseassary for him. ta taist

his

upper

bacso ta the left

ta get eraund

the

corner. As he went around the corner, he f^lt instant and sndden pain about
two inches below his belt line and to the i>ight in his lower back. He also
felt numbness in his buttocks and down the back of his legs. He proceeded to
set tlie sign down on some sawhorses and rocalis complaining of the pain in his
back 3t that time. He -HnighiM the shift that day, but could not sit or lift
for ttte rest of the day. Ha reported to work the next day, February 10, 1989,
but b§ could barely walk and his employer refused to allow him to work. The
applicant was driven to 10EKHKD by another employee at the employer's
direction. X-rays were taken there and he w^s immediately referred to Dr. RHorne, an orthopedist, for further evaluation. The applicant was driven back
to his employer's and his girlfriend picked M m up there and drove him to see
Dr. H o m e that same day.
Dr. H o m e had a CT scan done at Fort Union Imaging on February 13,
1989, -which -was read to show findings--at L5-S1—with, possible- problems. at
LS-4. Aosaid, hyphen and robaxin were prescribed and the applicant was
referred for physical therapy which began at Cottonwood Hospital approximately
February 23, 1989. Physical therapy witlj, monthly visits to Dr. H o m e
continued through June 1989. On June 22, 1989, a second CT scan was done at
the request of Dr. Home. This revealed much the same findings except that it
was ncjted that there was increased focal protrusion at L5-S1. 0a June 27,
1989, or* H o m e wrote the adjustor, smith Adn&nistrators. in that letter, Dr.
H o m e indicates that there was spondylolisthesis at the L-5 level. He notes
that there was continued back pain, at that time in spite of the time off work,
the physical therapy, the anti-imflammatqry medication and the aaiscle
relaxants and pain relievers. Because there had been no clinical improvement
with these conservative measures, Dr. H o m e suggests in that letter that a
fusion, L-4 through the sacrum, might be required. As noted in. the letter,
Dr. HOrne referred the applicant that same day to Alta View Hospital for a
discogtaxn to determine whether a "disc was involved."
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With the applicant continuing to see Dr. Eorae on a monthly basis,
the applicant was also referred by the insurance adjuster to see Dr- J. Lily.
Dr. Lily saw the applicant in August of 1989, and in a letter to the applicant
dated August 24, 1989, he notes that the February 10, 1989 CT scan shows that
there was a -non-acute* spondylolysis at L~5 that was clearly not caused by
the injury the day before. He notes in that letter that, based cm that CT
scan, he felt there was no compression of the £-1 nerve roots. He read the
scan to show L3—4 facet joint merited degenerative changes bilaterally. Dr.
Lily concluded that the applicant had pre-existing lumbar disc disease at L3-4
and LS-S1 and that he needed to learn lumbar stabilization exercises if he
wanted to avoid surgery, in a later letter to the applicant dated September
19, 1989, Dr. Lily clarifies his analysis somewhat and indicates that the
applicant had asymptomatic spondylolysis and spondylolisthesis prior to the
industrial injury. However, Dr. Lily indicates that all the present symptoms
suffered by the applicant were related to the industrial injury of February 9,
1989.
Responding to concerns expressed by the insurance adjuster regarding
the pre-existing nature of the applicant's back condition, Dr. H o m e wrote the
adjuster on September 28, 1989. In that letter, Dr. H o m e explains that even
though the applicant had a pre-existing condition (spondylolisthesis), the
injury on February 9, 1989 was an "acute- incident which caused a slip of the
pre-existing spondylitic defect. He rated the applicant as having 20% whole
person impairment per the A.M.A. Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment. A second independent medical examination was scheduled by the
insurance adjuster with Dr. R- Hansen in December of 1989. xn his report
dated December 1, 1989, Dr. Hansen notes that **X would be very cautious about <^—^
any surgical treatment.** This is apparently based on the fact that Dr. Han<5PTi
sees no strong evidence of any neurological deficits or impairment.
Nonetheless, Dr. TTfrH«rQ™ recommended future limitation of heavy lifting,
bending, stooping and twistingIn. January of 1990, the insurance adjuster referred the applicant to
+y>A Utah tfork Capacity and Rehabilitation Center for a job analysis and
functional capacity evaluation. The conclusion from, that analysis was that
the applicant's job as a sheetmetal fabricator was a medium/heavy job
requiring frequent bending and lifting. The applicant was rated as having a
work capacity to perform medium/light work only and was described as not being
feasible for competitive employment based on his workplace tolerances noted in
frfr* evaluation.
However, it was noted that the applicant demonstrated
appropriate motivation and it was felt that he would be a good candidate for a
structured work hardening program.
TftA applicant testified that he never had any back problems or
treatment prior to the February 9, 1989 industrial injury. He does recall one
fall at work several years ago where the wind got TrnocTfpd out of him, but he
stated he got no treatment for this and had no continuing problems as a result
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of the incident. Currently, the applicant continues to hare numbness and
shooting pains down his legs and his feet bum*
The pain in his back has
remained the same, while the numbness problems have gotten worse. The
applicant is desirous o£ having th£ stii?gery recommended by I>r. Home*
The medical panel report, received at the Industrial commission on
June 8, 1990 indicates that the surgery recommended by ftr. R. H o m e is
reasonably medically necessary as a result of the industrial injury. The
panel found that the applicant was medically stable as of the date of
examination (Hay. 8, 1990} and that the applicant had 20% whole person
impairment related to the industrial injury, with 1/2 or i d of that rating
attributable to the applicant's asymptomatic pre-existing spondylolisthesis
and 10% attributable to the industrial injury- The panel found that this
rating would most likely remain ths same even after the surgery proposed by
Dr* Borne.

COSCLUSTOES OF LAtf:

As the defendants filed no objection to the medical panel report,
that report is adopted and the defendants will be ordered to pay benefits in
line with the findings of the medical panel. This would include additional
temporary total compensation from January lf 1990 through Miy 8, 1990
(benefits may have already been paid through the end of January by the
carrier/adjustor, but this is not completely clear from the current record),
and permanent impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person rating that
the panel attrilnites to the February 94 198? industrial injury. Hhen and if
the applicant is scheduled for surgery, he will be entitled to additional
medical expenses and additional temporary total compensation for the period of
recovery associated with that surgery*
Counsel for the applicant has argued that the defendants should be
liable -for the entire 20% of back impairment that the. panel has rated,
frmm^l for the applicants argument, is as follows:
Specifically,
it
is our
view that
an aggravated
pre-existing asymptomatic condition must be paid by an
employer along with that portion of permanent partial
impairment attributable to the industrial accident. The
Hbllowar case supports our position with regard to that
since only two of the five Justices expressed the opinion
that the pre-existing condition could be either symptomatic
or asymptomatic* HGticeably, the three Judges who wrote
the majority decision did not agree with the two concurring
Justices on •*»*<* particular point, it is our position that
the Holloway case requires a ruling in Mr. Crosland's favor
requiring that the full 20% permanent impairment be paid
for by the employer.
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Counsel for the applicant also requests that the matter he referred
back, to the panel for a finding as to whether the pre-existing condition was
asymptomatic or not. This is not necessary. The panel clearly states that
the pre-existing condition was asymptomatic* Also, whether the condition was
asymptomatic or symptomatic is irrelevant. As pointed out by counsel for the
defendant in his response to counsel for the applicant's argument set forth
above, the case cited by counsel for the applicant, Holloway v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P,2d 31 (Utah 1986), does not conclude anything regarding
symptomatic or asymptomatic conditions. The concurring opinion discusses
this, concluding the exact opposite of what counsel for the applicant argues*
but the concurring opinion presumably does not sQt precedent. Holloway does
cite Allen v. Industrial Coirmrr salon, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) with approval.
The focus of A 1 T < m is whether a pre-existing condition contributes to the
injury sustained on the job, not whether the pre-existing condition is
symptomatic or asymptomatic. In this case, the panel states that both the
pre-existing condition and the job injury "are contributory* ** Thus, there is
no justification for finding that the full impairment is the responsibility of
the carrier- Had the panel found that the pre-existing condition was merely
an X-ray finding, with no causal contribution to the final injury and with no
rating associated with it, then counsel for the applicant* s argument would be
more persuasive. As it stands, the statute CU.C.&. 35-1-69) requires that the
carrier pay only for that impairment that is related to the industrial injury,
and unfortunately, the Employers Reinsurance Fund no longer is required to
contribute with respect to impairment aggravated by the industrial injury*
There being no statutory nor case law justification for finding the carrier
liable for the full impairment, the carrier is required to pay only the 10%
attributable to the industrial injury.
As not *n the permanent impairment benefits will be accrued, part of
the impairment award will be paid out on a periodic basis. If surgery is
scheduled during the period that the remaining permanent impairment benefits
are being paid periodically, the benefit rate should be changed back to the
temporary total compensation rate of $271.00 per week until the applicant
stabilizes from the surgery. During the payment of the" additional temporary
total compensation benefits, 20% of the benefits should be withheld to be
finally paid over to the applicant's attorney as his fee once the applicant
stabilizes. Any rttmRJTnng balance for permanent impairment should be paid to
the applicant at that point without discount for attorney fees.

ORDER:
XT IS THKEK&OBE OEDEHED that the defendants, Young Electric Sign
Company/Smith Administrators, pay the applicant, Gary Crosland, temporary
total compensation at the rate of $271.00 per week for 18 • 286 weeks (January
1, 1990 through May 8, 1990) or a total of *4,955.51, less amounts paid to
date for this period. This amount is to be paid in a lump sum plus interest
at 3% per annum per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded
below.
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XT IS FUEIHER ORDERED that the defendants,
Young Electric Sign
Company/Smith Administrators, pay the applicant, Gary crosland, permanent
partial impairment benefits at the rate of $229*00 per week for 31.2 weeks or
a total of $7,144.80. Accrued amounts are payable in a lump sum plus interest
at 8% per annum per U*C,A- 35-1-78*
IT IS SWI'HKK ORDERED that the defendants, Yotmg Electric Sign
Company/ Smith Administrators, pay Virginius Dalwiey, attorney for the
applicant, the sum of $2,420*06, as attorney's fees in this matter, said
amount to be deducted from the accrued temporary total compensation award of
the applicant and remitted directly to Virginius Dabney. This amount should
be adjusted downward by an amount emiai to 20% of any benefits paid to date
for the period of January 1, 1990 through Hay 8, 1990 •

IT IS WJKTHBR OHDESED that the defendants, Young. Electric Sign
Company/Smith Administrators, pay all medica7 expenses incurred as the result
o£ the February 9, 1989 industrial injury, said expenses to he paid in
accordance with the ?fAd1cal and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission,
H is FURTHKK ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof,
specifying- in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

jdk*~~— <%C*.

*

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the1 industrial Commission.
of trtah, Salt Lake". Cityf Utah, this

Patricia, o. Ashfey V ^
Commission Secretary

d-

CE2TIFICAXE OF MATLTSG

T certify tliat on August /-^7l990. a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of Gary Crosiand*
was mailed to the following persons at the following addrossos, postage paid:

Gary Crosiand, 540 East 374S South, SLC, UT 84106
Tirsinitus Dahney, Atty., 350 South 400 East, Suite 202, SLC, UT
84111
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Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated
(Standard of Review)
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection il)ia>
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161.
§ 3x5 m a k e s the act effective on January 1,
1988

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
<h) the agency action is:
<i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
< iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(ivi otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25. 1988. substituted "As
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals"' for The Supreme Court or
other appellate court designated by statute" in
Subsection <1); inserted "with the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" in Subsections i2)(a) and (2Mb).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
$ 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1,
1988

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Subsection d) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
$ 63-46b-15(lKa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
'Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
lb) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
Historv: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch! 161, § 273.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987. ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-4€b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review in-

formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conflicting evidence.
Factual findings.
Standard of review.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
Conflicting evidence.
In undertaking a review, the appellate court
will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the
court might have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before it for de novo review.
It is the province of the board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn
from the same evidence, it is for the board to
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Factual findings.
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court
tfill not disturb the board's application of its
'actual findings to the law unless its determilation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
ind rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v.
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App.
.989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec, 801 P.2d
.58 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Standard of review.
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for
court to review an agency's interpretation of
Is statutorily granted powers and authority as
question of law, with no deference to the
gency's view of the law. The correction-ofrror standard will be applied to such an issue
nd the agency's statutory interpretation will
e upheld only if it is concluded to be not erro-

neous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Utah
Adv. Rep. 99 (Ct. App. 1990).
Substantial evidence test.
In applying the "substantial evidence test,"
the appellate court reviews the "whole record"
before the court, and this review is distinguishable from both a de novo review and the "any
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude
in reviewing the record than was previously
granted under the Utah Employment Security
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less
than the weight of the evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
The party challenging the findings must
marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting
facts, the agency's findings are not supported
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163
(Utah 1990).
Substantial prejudice.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
for a new hearing, where the failure to afford
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him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
Whole record test.
The "whole record test" necessarily requires
that a party challenging the board's findings of
fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

Under the "whole record test," a court must
consider not only the evidence supporting the
board's factual findings, but also the evidence
that fairly detracts from the weight of the
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White &
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Scope of review.
The agency's factual findings will be upheld
if they are supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court. Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec.,
782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The agency's application of law to its factual
findings will not be disturbed unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality. Johnson v. Department of
Emp. Sec., 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

63-46b-22. Transition procedures.
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review
contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings
commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988.
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial
review that are in effect on December 31,1987, govern all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31,
1987, even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on
January 1, 1988.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-22, enacted by L.
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 69.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted
"or" for "and" before "after January 1, 1988" in
Subsection (1),

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,
781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated
(Permanent Partial Disability)

35-1-66

LABOR -

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for
work at any time prior to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years after the date of the injury. Payments shall
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L.
1981, ch.. 287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the
previously undesignated first two paragraphs
as Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection ll),
divided the formerly undivided language into
an introductory paragraph and Paragraphs (a)
and (b). rewriting the contents thereof; in Subsection (2 . divided the formerly undivided Ianguage into an introductory paragraph and

Paragraphs (a) and (b), substituted "hearing
under § 35-1-99" for "such purpose prior to the
expiration of such eight-year period" in Paragraph (b) and. in Paragraph (a), substituted
"the injury" for "such injury" and made a
minor punctuation change; deleted the former
l a s t undesignated paragraph, which read "In
n o c a s e shM
t h e w e e k l y p a y m e n t s contlnue
after the disabilit
J

d

j
r

e n d s o r t h e d e a t h of

„

and added Subsectl0n

the
(3).

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section
35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial disability award from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or
the death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years,
up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid
weekly for the number of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint,
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon .. 168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
101
202
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For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of
carpometacarpal bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal
bone
42
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal
bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal
bone
17
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal
bone
8
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
156
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or GrittiStokes amputation or below knee with short stump (three
inches or less below intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
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For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of
the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the
complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not
apply to the items listed [in] (B) (4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as
follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps)
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of
hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000
cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second
is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical
professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear
at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second which
shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average decibel
loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average
decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by
ll/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 92 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in
the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of
binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this
chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims for hearing loss the
percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall be deducted from
any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall compensation
benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks
of compensation benefits.
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not
otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent
partial disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission based on
the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as closely
as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in
this section. Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case
exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation for
permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to
the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no
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event shall more than a maximum of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required
to be paid.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 77; C.L. 1917,
$ 3138; L. 1919, ch. 63, $ 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-62; L. 1937, ch. 41, $ 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1;
C. 1943, 42-1-62; L. 1945, ch. 65, * 1; 1949, ch.
52, $ 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1;
1957. ch. 62, $ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch.
71. § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1;
1967. ch. 65, $ 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 4; 1971, ch.
76, § 5; 1973, ch. 67, § 3; 1977, ch. 151, § 2;
1977. ch. 156, $ 5; 1981, ch. 287, § 3; 1983,
ch. 357, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1. 1988, rewrote the first

paragraph, substituted "Weekly payments
may not in any case" for "In no case shall the
weekly payments" in the second paragraph, deleted the former sixth paragraph, which defined "presbycusis," and substituted the
present next-to-last paragraph for the former
next-to-iast paragraph, relating to other disfigurements or losses of bodily function not otherwise provided for.
Cross-References. — Change of award for
willful misconduct of employer or employee,
§§ 35-1-12, 35-1-14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Back injuries.
Blindness of one eye.
Common-law measure of damages.
Disfigurement.
Effect of voluntary payments.
Eye injuries.
Hand injury
Hearing loss.
Jurisdiction of federal courts.
Limitations on supplemental claims.
Loss of bodily function.
Maximum benefits.
Medical expenses.
Mental impairment.
Offsetting amount because of overpayment for temporary total disability.
Operation and effect.
Other or additional compensation.
Permanent total disability claims.
Review of findings.
Scope of judicial review.
Statute of limitations.
Test of total disability.
Cited.
Back injuries.
The words "in proportion as near as may be
to compensation for specific loss as set forth in
the schedule," which are authorized for disfigurements or losses of bodily function which are
not scheduled in the act. does not relate to an
injured back because there are no scheduled
injuries in the statute that have any relationship to an injured back. What the legislature
apparently had in mind when it used the
quoted words was losses of bodily function of
similar nature to those scheduled, such as an
injury to an arm, short of amputation, the impairment of eyesight, short of blindness, and

the like. Markus v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Utah
2d 347, 301 P 2 d 1084 (1956).
Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award miner with back
injury full compensation from the time he left
his job until rehired since compensation during
total disability does not necessarily mean until
the employee is able to do his former work.
Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d
214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965).
Blindness of one eye.
Award of Industrial Commission of 100
weeks' compensation for total blindness of one
eye, a substantial function of which was re-
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stored by use of optical lens, was not capricious, arbitrary, or unreasonable where the
commission determined, within its prerogative, that the injury resulted in the blindness
to the eye. Western Contracting Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d 125
(1964).
Common-law measure of damages.
Since proceeding before Industrial Commission is not an action for damages, rules respecting measure of damages must be disregarded
and statutory regulations applied in computing
compensation.
Broderick
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 63 Utah 210, 224 P. 876 (1924).
Payment of compensation for an accidental
injury arising out of or in course of industrial
employment is in no sense a payment for damages, and rules respecting the measure of damages in law actions do not apply. Spencer v.
Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188,
affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935).
Disfigurement.
Injury to vision of employee from electric
flash was not case of "any other disfigurement,
or loss of bodily function not otherwise provided for herein," within this provision. Moray
v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P.
1023 (1921) (decided prior to 1988 amendment).
First part of this section, providing that
"Where injury causes partial disability for
work," referred to injuries specifically enumerated in this section, so compensation for injury
consisting of the crushing together of three
vertebrae interfering with motion of spine was
properly computed under provision dealing
with "any other disfigurement or loss of bodily
function not otherwise provided for herein."
Vukelich v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Utah 486,
220 P. 1073 (1923) (decided prior to 1988
amendment).
Words, "other disfigurement" do not seem to
have any practical significance. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utah 86,
272 P. 239 (1928) (decided prior to 1988
amendment).
Loss sustained by the employee because of
the extraction of his teeth is a "disfigurement"
within the meaning of this section. Gunnison
Sugar Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utah 535,
275 P. 777 (1929) (decided prior to 1988
amendment).
The words "any other disfigurement" in this
section warrant an award for loss of one front
tooth and fracturing of another, for "loss of
bodily function" need not impair present earning capacity. Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 Utah 556, 286 P. 959 (1930)
(decided prior to 1988 amendment).
Effect of voluntary payments.
Award was not prejudicial to employer in al-

legedly failing to take into account payments
voluntarily made by employer prior to entry of
award where employee was entitled to 200
weeks' compensation for loss of arm under this
section, as well as compensation for temporary
total disability under § 35-1-65, and award
was for 200 weeks' compensation; commission
considered payments as compensation due for
temporary disability under § 35-1-65. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Eye injuries.
Commission's award to claimant for loss of
vision due to injury to eye muscles causing
double vision was affirmed despite contention
that claimant did not suffer "total blindness of
one eye" within meaning of statute since each
of claimant's eyes considered alone had substantial vision and only when they worked together as visual system was effect of injury
manifest, and despite further contention that
because commission had previously ordered
award for only one-half amount subsequently
awarded, subsequent award was arbitrary and
capricious. Goodyear Serv. Store v. Industrial
Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1968).
In proceeding for compensation, wherein it
appeared that employee suffered injury to vision of eye from electric flash equal to 10% in
one and 5% in other eye, an allowance of $16 a
week for fifteen weeks, or an amount equal to
15% of allowance of 100 weeks for total permanent loss of vision in one eye, was sufficient.
Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199
P. 1023 (1921).
Hand injury.
Injury to employee's hand, disabling him
from working, is a compensable injury.
Katsanos v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 479,
267 P. 781 (1928).
If employee lost by amputation the third,
fourth, and fifth digits of hand and part of palm
or surface thereof, he should receive compensation as if hand were entirely lost. The words
"other disfigurement" appearing in this section
do not seem to have any practical significance.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n,
73 Utah 86, 279 P. 239 (1928) (decided prior to
1988 amendment).
Hearing loss.
This section does not make any provision for
compensation for loss of hearing associated
with advanced age, presbycusis. Wayman v
Western Coal Carrier Corp., 665 P.2d 1294
(Utah 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amendment).
Jurisdiction of federal courts.
Where state Industrial Commission mistakenly awarded injured employee award of total
disability for only partial loss of vision, equity
powers of federal court could not be invoked to
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Maximum benefits.
Plaintiff, who received temporary total disability compensation commencing with the
date of his injury and later was paid permanent total disability benefits prior to his return
to work, was not entitled to maximum compensation for both temporary total and permanent
partial disability but was entitled only to permanent partial disability benefits subject to
the limitations set forth in the last paragraph
of § 35-1-67. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett, 737
P.2d 986 (Utah 1987).

enjoin enforcement of award since commission
acted mistakenly, yet legally, and within, but
not beyond, its jurisdiction. United States
Smelting. Ref. & Mining Co. v. Evans, 35 F.2d
459 <8th Cir. 1929*. cert, denied, 281 U.S. 744,
74 L. Ed. 1157. 50 S. Ct. 350 (1930).
Limitations on supplemental claims.
This section rather than $ 35-1-78 governs
filing of supplemental claims for recurrence of
an injury; $ 35-1-78 does not abrogate or create an exception to the limitation imposed by
this section. Claimant who requested and accepted lump-sum settlement for his injury was
not entitled to supplemental compensation
when partial paralysis resulted from surgery
thirteen years later. United States Smelting,
Ref. & Mining Co. v. Nielson, 19 Utah 2d 239,
430 P.2d 162 (1967), affd, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437
P.2d 199 (1968).
Loss of bodily function.
Where injury to miner resulted in amputation of first three fingers of right hand at proximal joint, removal of chip from head of metacarpal bone of index finger, and amputation of
little finger at junction of second and third
phalanges, award made on basis of 507c loss of
use of right hand on theory that where several
fingers are lost it is the loss of a "bodily function not otherwise provided for'' in schedule of
this section, was proper, as against contention
that it was intended by statute to compensate
for loss of all fingers by adding scheduled benefits for loss of each finger. North Beck Mining
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 58 Utah 486, 200 P.
I l l (1921) (decided prior to 1988 amendment).
Where ultimate question is not one of loss of
bodily function but actual partial or total disability economically and industrially, the loss
of bodily function is only an aid to such ultimate question, and doctors should testify only
as to such loss and not to the ultimate question
of industrial and economic disability; except
where the doctor qualified in addition to his
medical knowledge that he has sufficient
knowledge of what physical of mental abilities
a certain occupation or vocation calls for, or
where such testimony is as to certain common
industrial, economic, or household functions,
such as climbing ladders, sweeping or digging,
in which case the doctor may testify. Silver
King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 92 Utah 511, 69 P.2d 608 (1937).
Contention of corporation, seeking reduction
in award, that compensation awards were created only as a compensation for loss of bodily
functions which reduce earning capacity, is not
correct. Under this section the scheduled
awards for loss of bodily parts and functions
are in addition to the compensation provided
for temporary total disability. Western Contracting Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah
2d 208, 390 P.2d 125 (1964).

Medical e x p e n s e s .
The period of limitations in this section also
applied to claim under § 35-1-81 for medical
expenses arising from injury compensated by
this section. United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 145. 493 P.2d 986
(1972).
Medical and hospital care benefits are not
subject to same limitations as compensation for
wages lost or disability rating; claimant was
entitled to continued medical expenses where
the orders for payment of original medical expenses were not definitely limited, were mterpretable as being "open end" and employer had
been aware that the claimant's injuries were
such that he would never fully and permanently recover but would need future medical
care. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson. 30
Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973).
Mental impairment.
Regardless of whether loss of ability to earn
such wages as applicant was receiving at time
of accident is by reason of either a physical or
mental impairment, he is entitled to compensation. Utah-Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial
Comm'n. 71 Utah 490, 267 P. 785 U928).
Offsetting amount b e c a u s e of overpayment for temporary total disability.
Industrial commission did not act contrary to
law or unreasonably in ordering that amount
owed employee for permanent partial disability be offset by a prior overpayment of amount
paid to employee for temporary total disability
pertaining to the same injury, with the balance
of the overpayment being credited against any
future compensation the employer might owe
the employee because of the industrial accident. Hudson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 662 P.2d
29 (Utah 1983'.
Operation and effect.
There is no conflict between this section and
$ 35-1-67. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 74 Utah"l03, 277 P. 206 (1929).
Other or additional compensation.
In proceeding by employee for additional
compensation, whether disability from which
applicant was suffering at time of application
arose from accident or from old hernia of long
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standing was a question which industrial comnmission had power to determine without judilicial review. Littsos v. Industrial Comm'n, 57
>7
Utah 259. 194 P. 338 <1920>.
Award of compensation for temporary totali
disability in addition to compensation for loss
of limb cannot be allowed generally, but suchi
award was properly allowed where unexpectedi
'
complications arose making it impossible for
injured employee to use artificial limb until• i
d
another amputation could be performed.
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
^
60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611 (1922).
Other or additional compensation for a temiporary disability to which an applicant may be
>e
entitled by reason of an industrial accident is
is
not to be considered in reduction of the definite
ue
amount provided for the loss of an arm.
iKatsanos v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 479,
5»
267 P. 781 (1928).
Whether condition of permanent partial dis3ability resulted from accident in question or
>r
resulted from aggravation of pre-existing conidition, applicant is entitled to compensation. If
tf
a latent disease or trouble is accelerated or
»r
lighted up by an industrial accident and aa
more serious injury results by reason of thee
existence of such latent ailment than otherwise would have resulted, the injured em-iployee is entitled to additional compensation.iUtah-Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n,i»
71 Utah 490, 267 P. 785 (1928).
If the insurance carrier acquiesces in an ad-Iditional award of compensation and pays it, itt
thereby waives its right to set up the originalil
settlement as a bar against that award. Aetnaa
Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utahh
366, 274 P. 139 (1929).
Permanent total disability claims.
This section does not impose any limitation
on the time within which application for per-n
manent total disability benefits must be filed.
Buxton v. Industrial Comm'n, 587 P.2d 121I.
1
(Utah 1978).
Review of findings.
If there is any evidence to sustain commission's finding of permanent partial disability,,

it will not be disturbed on appeal. Utah-Idaho
Cent. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 490.
267 P. 785 (1928).
Scope of judicial review.
When factual findings of commission as to
source and extent of applicant's injuries are
based upon substantial and competent evidence, they will not be disturbed by court.
Goodyear Serv. Store v. Industrial Comm'n, 21
Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1900).
Statute of limitations.
Where claim arose when section had a sixyear statute of limitations, and the claim was
still alive under that statute of limitations
when the 1973 amendment increased the statute of limitations from six to eight years,
claimant had eight years from the time of the
injury in which to file a supplemental claim.
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224 (Utah
1978).
Where employee suffered an injury in November of 1975 and notice of injury and claim
was properly given and filed in accordance
with requirements of S§ 35-1-99 and 35-1-100,
and employee was paid temporary total disability benefits through August of 1978, employee's claim for permanent partial disability
based on 1975 injury and filed in January of
1983 was not barred by three-year statute of
limitations in § 35-1-99, but was subject to
eight-year statute of limitations in this section,
and was therefore filed within applicable statute of limitations period. Dean Evans Chrysler
Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984)
(decided prior to 1988 amendment).
Test of total disability.
Employee who had only partial loss of vision
which was subject to correction by use of
glasses did not sustain total disability; the test
of such disability being whether it prevents
employee from doing work for which he is
adapted, and not that in which he was injured.
United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v.
Evans, 35 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1929).
Cited in Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 302.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
«=» 1641.
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35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section
35-1-98 may receive a permanent partial disability award from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or
the death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years,
up to a maximum of four dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid in
routine pay periods not to exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability:
For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow
joint, or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps
tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(2)(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(2Kb) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joint .. 101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of
carpometacarpal bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
42
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At interphalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal
bone
17
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
46
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(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
8
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
<o At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy <leg, hip and pelvis)
156
<b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of
ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or
Gritti-Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump (three
inches or less below intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation tChopart's)
66
<c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joint
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
109
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to
loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage
}f the complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B)(4).
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is
lot otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, permalent partial disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission
:>ased on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment
>hall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the
schedule set forth in this section. Permanent partial disability compensaion may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the
)eriod of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Permalent partial disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent
mpairment that existed prior to an industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations
is to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section,
md in no event shall more than a maximum of 662/.3% of the state average
47
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weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compe
sation be required to be paid.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 77; C.L. 1917,
§ 3138; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-62; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1;
C. 1943, 42-1-62; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch.
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1;
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch.
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1;
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 4; 1971, ch.
76, § 5; 1973, ch. 67, § 3; 1977, ch. 151, § 2;
1977, ch. 156, § 5; 1981, ch. 287, § 3; 1983,
ch. 357, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 3; 1990, ch. 69,
§ 3; 1990, ch. 109, § 2; 1991, ch. 136, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 69, effective April 23, 1990, substituted "Section 35-1-98" for "Section 35-1-99" in

the first undesignated paragraph and "in ro
tine pay periods not to exceed four weeks' f
"weekly" in the third undesignated paragrap
and inserted "in" in the last sentence in Su
section (C).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 109, effectn
April 23, 1990, substituted f,in routine pay p<
riods not to exceed four weeks" for "weekh
near the end of the third paragraph and mac
three minor stylistic changes.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 2S
1991, substituted "109" for "100" at iter
(B)(4)(c) and deleted several undesignate
paragraphs relating to hearing loss.

35-1-66.1, Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss
due to noise to be compensated.
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise
or by direct head injury shall be compensated according to the terms and
conditions of this chapter.
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful industrial noise
shall be paid under this chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that the employee has been exposed to harmful
industrial noise as defined in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the employer against whom the claim is made.
History: C. 1953, 35-2-58, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 87, § 5; 1991, ch. 136, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as

§ 35-2-58; added the Subsection (1) designation, inserted "or by direct head injury,'' and
substituted "chapter" for "act" in that Subsection; and added Subsection (2).

35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined.
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the sound emanating from equipment and machines during employment exceeding the following permissible
sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding durations per day, in
hours:
Sound Level

Duration

8
6
4
3
2
1.4
1.0
0.5

90
2
95
97
100
102
105
110
115

0.25 (
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Procedure.
The statutes do not require the Second Injury Fund (now the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund) to be a participant or even a party in
every proceeding before the commission, but
once the prospect of fund liability appears, the
fund is an "interested party" or a "party in interest" under the statutes and is entitled to
receive, in its own right and through its own
authorized representative rather than through
the commission generally, a notice of the hearing, a copy of the administrative law judge's
findings, notice of entry of the commission's
order, and it is entitled to file a motion for review with the commission. Paoli v. Cottonwood
Hosp., 656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982).
Where the Second Injury Fund (now the Employers' Reinsurance Fund) has elected not to
participate and its presence has not been directed in a hearing before an administrative
law judge and an order against the fund has
been entered, the fund should be allowed to
reopen the case upon motion for review under
§ 35-1-82.53 in order to submit further evidence bearing on the special interest and liability of the fund. Paoli v. Cottonwood Hosp
656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982).
I i!Liu\

Reimbursement.
The payment made under former Subsection
(2)(a), providing for the payment of death benefits to the uninsured employers fund when a
decedent leaves no dependents, was not "compensation" within the meaning of § 35-1-62,
which provides for reimbursement for compensation payments in wrongful death recoveries,
and where the decedent's parents sued the tortfeasor and its insurer, the insurance fund could
neither invade the parents' recovery nor pursue a separate claim against the insurer in order to recover the amount paid into the Second
Injury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d
1330 (Utah 1986).
Rights of administrator.
Where employee without dependents was injured, and industrial commission had decided
he was entitled to compensation for certain
number of weeks, but employee subsequently
died from other causes prior to award, administrator was not entitled to compensation.
Heiselt Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 58
Utah 59, 197 P. 589, 15 A.L.R. 799 (1921).

I h l i A I . ItLHhulHlhlNCES

Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Labor,
1987 Utah L. Rev. 227.
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 321 et seq.

A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation: posthumous children and children born after accident
as dependents, 18 A.L.R.3d 900.
Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation
«=» 1673.

35-1-69, Payments from Employers* Kcmsiiraiu.'t1 Luml.
If an employee, who has at least a 10%' whole person permanent impairment
from any cause or origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and if
the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer
or its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for
the payment of benefits as follows:
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the first $20,000
of medical benefits and the initial three years of permanent total disability compensation as provided in this title.
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the first $20,000 shall be
paid in the first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Then,
as provided in Subsection (5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall
reimburse the employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those expenses.
(3) After the initial three-year period under Subsection (1) permanent
total disability compensation payable to an employee under this title
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
(4) If it Is determined that the employee is permanently and totally
disabled,, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be gi\ en credit for all
220
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prior payments of temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent
partial disability compensation made as a result of the industrial accident. Any overpayment by the employer or its insurance carrier shall be
reimbursed by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6).
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund shall reimburse the employer or its insurance carrier for the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and compensation
paid to or on behalf of an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsurance
Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of
payment of the medical or disability compensation for which the reimbursement is requested. Each request is subject to review as to reasonableness by the commission. The commission may determine the manner
of reimbursement.
<6) If. at the time an employee is determined to be permanently and
totally disabled, the employee has other actionable workers' compensation claims, the employer or insurance carrier that is liable for the last
industrial accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be liable
for the benefits payable by the employer as provided in this section. The
employee's entitlement to benefits for prior actionable claims shall then
be determined separately on the facts of those claims. Any previous permanent partial disability arising out of those claims shall then be considered to be impairments that give rise to Employers' Reinsurance Fund
liability under this section.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-69, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 116, ^ 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Law? 1988.
ch. 118, ^ 6 repeal* former $ 35-1-69. as last

amended by Laws 1984. ch. 79. a 1, relating to
combined ir.june.- resulting in permanent incapacity. effective July I, 1988. and enacts the
present section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amount of award.
—Liability of second employer.
—Percentage of impairment.
Application.
Apportionment of liability.
Definitions.
Employee completely compensated.
Findings of commission.
Liability for benefits attributable to nonphvsical unemployability factors.
Medical panel determination.
Medical testimony.
No apportionment of insurer's liability.
Preexisting condition previously compensated.
Preexisting contributing condition.
—Substantially greater incapacity following industrial injury.
Presbycusis.
Prior tnjury in military service.
Purposes.
Recovery from fund denied.
Remainder paid out of fund.
Serial consideration of separate accidents.
Special Fund.
Strict application.
Temporary disability benefits.

221

35-1-69

LABOR — INIHISTRIAI I OMM1SMUN

Amount of award.
—Liability of second employer.
This section makes the second employer liable only for the medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits in proportion to
the disability sustained by the worker in the
second accident. Day's Mkt., Inc. v. Muir, 719
P.2d 528 (Utah 1986).
—Percentage of impairment.
An injured employee is entitled to an award
of compensation from his employer based upon
the percentage of impairment to the whole
man, and is not restricted to partial man ratings, although the employer's proportion of liability for compensation is equal to the percentage of total impairment attributable to the industrial injury. Kerans v Industrial Comm'n,
713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985)
Application.
This section neither expressly nor impliedly
limits its application to only multiple-employer
circumstances, nor to cases where the previous
incapacitating injury was nonindustrial.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983).
In order to determine if Second Injury Fund
had application, the commission was required
to determine if the current impairment was
substantially greater than it would have been
in the absence of preexisting incapacity. Day's
Mkt., Inc. v Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)
(based on statute prior to 1981 amendment).
Apportionment of liability.
Where injured employee had one preexisting
whole man impairment of 25%, and a second
preexisting whole man impairment of 10%, the
injury caused by the present industrial accident was equal to a whole man impairment of
50%, and these impairments combined equaled
a total physical impairment of 67%, this 67%
total impairment figure was a combined partial man figure, and in apportioning liability
between the employer and the fund the whole
man impairment ratings had to be reduced to
their partial man equivalents; in this case, the
combined preexisting whole man impairment
ratings, 25% and 10%, had an equivalent of a
33% partial man impairment, making the correct assessment of liability to the fund of
^ ^ t h s or 49%, and the 50% whole man impairment rating had an equivalent of a 34% partial
man impairment, making the employer liable
for ^Antlis or 51%. Jacobsen Constr v Hair,
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983).
In apportioning total disability award between employer and his insurer and the fund,
the commission correctly held fund liable for
the proportion that the preexisting impairment

bore to the total combined impairment. Second
Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet Shop,
684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1983).
An employer and its insurer should be allowed to recover from the fund, for their payment of medical expenses and disability payments, an amount equal to the proportion of
the employee's disability that is attributable to
his preexisting impairments, even though no
portion of the medical expenses or the time off
from work that resulted in the disability award
is caused by the employee's preexisting impairments. Veyo Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 710 P.2d 172 (Utah 1985).
All that is needed to bring about fund liability for those portions of a worker's incapacity
attributable to prior degenerative diseases and
other preexisting conditions is a showing that
the preexisting impairment and the industrial
injury cumulatively result in a substantially
greater degree of disability than there would
have been without the preexisting impairment,
and it is not necessary that a causal connection
be shown between the preexisting impairment
and the industrial injury. Hall v. Industrial
Comm'n, 710 P 2d 175 <ITtah 1985).
Definitions.
Word "employer" is used in this section to
encompass an employer in a situation where
the employment status is localized in Utah.
United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 (1946).
Employee completely compensated.
Employee was not entitled to additional compensation from the second injury fund where
he had been completely compensated for both
his prior incapacities and impairments resulting from a prior industrial accident and for his
current incapacities and impairments resulting from the present industrial accident. David
v. Industrial Comm'n, 649 P.2d 82 (Utah 1982).
Findings of commission
The finding of the commission upon sufficient evidence that the employee would be
totally and permanently disabled will not be
disturbed where he had previously lost vision
in one eye and subsequently lost one-half vision in remaining eye, together with other injuries. Brown, Terry & Woodruff Co. v. Industrial Comm n, 78 Utah 15, 300 P. 945 (1931).
liability for benefits attributable to nonphysical unemployability factors.
The fund should bear the cost of disability
payments to the extent that the preexisting
impairment, acting in combination with factors such as age, mental abilities and lack of
rehabilitative prospects, contributed to the employee's total disability; thus, a proper assess-
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should be determined by the proportion which
the preexisting physical impairment bears to
the additional physical impairment resulting
from the instant industrial accident Northwest Carriers Inc v Industrial Comm n 639
P2d 138 i t t a h 1981)

35-1-69

Industrial Comm n, 535 P 2d 1249 (Utah
1975)

Medical panel determination.
This section is explicit in its requirement
that the commission ^hall appoint a medical
panel to review all medical aspects of the case
and to determine the percentage of impairment
attributable to the various accidents United
States Fid & Guar Co v Industrial Comm n,
657 P2d 764 (Utah 1983)
Where the commission without the assistance of a medical panel determined that the
total percentage of partial impairment was
15r/r, 109c from the prior injurv and D°> from
the combined subsequent injurv the 10rr disability measurement was correctly utilized bv
the commission since it had been determined
by a medical panel in a prior proceeding regarding the establishment of habihtv for the
initial injury, however, the 5^ determination
representing the effects of the subsequent injury was made by a lone doctor and therefore
did not satisfy the requirement of a medical
panel determination United States Fid &
Guar Co v Industrial Comm n, 657 P 2d 764
(Utah 1983)
Medical testimony.
Where the ultimate question is not one of
loss of bodily function but actual partial or
total disability economically and industrially,
as provided in this section, the loss of bodily
function is only an aid to such ultimate question and doctors should testify only as to such
loss and not to the ultimate question of industrial and economic disability, except where the
doctor qualified, in addition to his medical
knowledge, has sufficient knowledge of what
physical or mental abilities a certain occupation or vocation calls for or where such testimony is as to certain common industrial, economic, or household functions such as climbing
ladders, sweeping or digging, in which case the
doctor may testify Silver King Coalition
Mines Co v Industrial Comm n, 92 Utah 511,
69 P2d 608 U937)
No apportionment of insurer's liability.
Where employee suffered aggravation of
back injuries when involved in three separate
accidents while working for two different emplovprs insured by three different insurance
carriers, commission properly required last
carrier to pay compensation for all permanent
disability, medical expenses and temporary
disability, in absence of statutory authority for
apportionment Mountain States Steel Co v

Preexisting condition previously compensated.
To the extent that his preexisting condition
was attributable to a prior railroad accident,
for which claimant had been rated and compensated in Arkansas, claimant was not entitled to recover additional compensation from
the fund order denving compensation from
fund was s>et aside where there was no evidentiary support in the record that the preexisting
condition was entirely attributable to the previously compensated
injury
Paoh v
Cottonwood Hosp 656 P 2d 420 (Utah 1982)
Preexisting contributing condition.
Industrial Commission s finding that claimant was totaliv and permanently disabled was
justified despite fact that claimant had previously existing heart and lung trouble which
contributed
to his present
condition
Halvorson Inc v Williams. 19 Utah 2d 113,
426 P2d 1019 (1967)
Although the claimant may have had a preexisting disability, the commission findings,
which are based on reasonable evidence that
the injury complained of is the sole cause of the
disability for which the award is made, do not
exceed its authority or indicate a capricious,
arbitrary or unreasonable act Hafers, Inc v
Industrial Comm n, 526 P 2d 1188 (Utah
1974)
Where preexisting condition required no
treatment prior to accident, but increased the
resultant disability by one-third, employer was
obligated to pay only two-thirds of claimant's
medical bills while the special fund would pay
the remaining third, the fact that the preexisting condition was quiescent prior to the injury
did not render it "insubstantial" so as to make
the employer liable for all costs incurred Intermountain Health Care, Inc v Ortega, 562 P 2d
617 (Utah 1977)
Where preexisting condition increased the
disability resulting from an industrial injury,
the employer was obligated only to pay the portion of expense and disability attributable to
the industrial injury and the fund was obligated to pav the portion attributable to the
preexisting condition Intermountain Health
Care, Inc v Ortega, 562 P 2d 617 (Utah 1977),
White v Industrial Comm n, 604 P 2d 478
(Utah 1979) Intermountain Smelting Corp v
Capitano 610 P 2d 334 (Utah 1980)
Employer is responsible only for the percentage of compensation and medical care equal to
the percentage of applicant's total disability attributable to the industrial injury and the remainder shall be paid out of the fund Intermountain Smelting Corp v Capitano, 610
P2d 334 (Utah 1980)
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—Substantially greater incapacity follow
ing industrial injury.
When a worker's total incapacity following a
second injury is "substantially greater" than it
would have been but for the preexisting incapacity, fund liability is imposed, and it is not
necessary that the second injury itself causes
"substantially greater" incapacity. Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 709 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1985) (decided under prior law).
Under this section, preexisting impairments
which are not aggravated by an industrial injury are to be compensated for when the industrial injury produces an impairment "substantially greater" than it would have been absent
the preexisting condition, regardless of any
causal or functional relationship between the
industrial injury and the preexisting condition.
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985).
For determining the 10 and 20 percent
threshold degrees of impairment, a whole-man
(percentage impaired) basis is used, not a partial-man (percentage unimpaired) basis. Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985).
The degree of increased incapacity statutor
ily required by the words "substantially
greater" is satisfied if the contribution of the
preexisting impairment to the total combined
impairments is definite and measurable. It is
enough if the two impairments cumulatively
result in a greater degree of disability. Kerans
v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985).
To meet the "substantially greater" test of
this section, a claimant need not prove a physical or causal relationship between the pre-existing incapacity and the industrial injury.
Rather, it is sufficient if the claimant's incapacity resulting from the industrial injury is
"substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity." Resulting incapacity is "substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity" if the resulting incapacity from all causes combined is
substantially greater than that resulting solely
from the industrial injury. Rex E. Lantham Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 717 P.2d 255 (Utah
1986).
Presbycusis
Loss of hearing associated with advanced
age, presbycusis, is not compensable by the
fund. Wayman v. Western Coal Carrier Corp ,
665 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1983).
Prior injury in military service.
The commission erred in denying c i a i m ant
compensation from the fund for part of his
prior disability resulting from injuries sustained while he was in the military service for
which the military continued to compensate

him. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cvcle Prods., Inc..
725 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1986)."
Purposes.
This section had two purposes: first, to encourage the employment of handicapped
workers by requiring the special fund to assume responsibility should the employee receive industrial injuries rendering him totally
disabled, and second, to establish a broader
base of responsibility for preexisting conditions. McPhie v. United States Steel Corp, 551
P.2d 504 (Utah 1976).
This section has several purposes; one of
them is to make it easier for persons who have
previous injuries or disabilities to obtain employment; another is that the objective just
stated is served by conferring a benefit upon
employers by minimizing the risks to them in
hiring such persons. Intermountain Smelting
Corp v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980).
Recovery from fund denied.
Where law judge found that assessment of
permanent incapacity in the medical evaluation was merely a restatement of the disability
rating given after a 1974 Nebraska accident
from which plaintiff had satisfactorily recovered, and was not an independent, impartial
review of plaintiffs condition at the time, it
was reasonable for law judge to conclude that
plaintiff did not sustain permanent incapacity
which is substantially greater than he would
have incurred if he had not had the preexisting
incapacity; therefore, the fund had no application. Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 656
P.2d 440 (Utah 1982).
Remainder paid out of fund.
"Remainder" means whatever remains to be
paid after the employer has discharged its liability, and where employee has in fact been
rendered permanently and totally disabled,
lifetime benefits would become the "remainder" and payable out of the fund. McPhie v.
Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977).
Serial consideration of separate accidents.
The commission must consider separate accidents serially in order to determine the percentage of impairment attributable to each accident and the proportion the preexisting impairment bears to the total combined impairment. Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson, 733
P.2d 178 (Utah 1987).
Special Fund.
Employer is liable for permanent total disability resulting from last of a series of injuries, and no resort can be had to special fund
(now Employers' Reinsurance Fund) under provisions of § 35-1-68(1). Standard Coal Co v.
Industrial Comm'n, 69 Utah 83, 252 P. 292
(1926).
Coal miner who lost sight in eye before
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Workmen's Compensation Act was effective
and who thereafter lost use of leg was entitled
to compensation from special fund (now Employers' Reinsurance Fund) as provided by this
section notwithstanding that first injury was
incurred before act became effective. Marker v.
Industrial Comm'n. 34 Utah 587, 37 P.2d 785,
98 A.L.R. 722 «1934).
This chapter does not evidence legislative intent to require an employer whose employee is
killed while temporarily engaged in employment in Utah, although hired and regularly
employed elsewhere, to pay into the Special
Fund (now Employers' Reinsurance Fund), provided by this section and $ 35-1-70, the
amount provided by $ 35-1-68, if she leaves no
dependents. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n. 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d
752 (1946).

Strict application.
Since Workmen's Compensation Act imposes
liability upon employer regardless of fault, employer is entitled to rely on a strict application
of the statute as to the extent of his responsibility. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v.
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980).
Temporary disability benefits.
Employer and its insurance carrier are responsible for paying all medical expenses and
temporary disability benefits up until period of
that disability ends; however, fund must reimburse carrier for that percentage of temporary
disability expenses attributable to preexisting
disability once determination of combined disability is made. American Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1981. 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 212.
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 304.

Key Numbers.
e=> 867.

Workers' Compensation

35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases.
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of
this title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition,
and under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such
benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the
special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917,
§ 3140, subsec. 7; L. 1921, ch. 67, $ 1; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-66.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Definitions.
Duty to pay into fund.
Definitions.
Word "employer" is used in this section to
encompass an employer in a situation where
the employment status is localized in Utah.
United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 (1946).
Duty to pay into fund.
This chapter does not evidence legislative intent to require an employer whose employee is

killed while temporarily engaged in employment in Utah, although hired and regularly
employed elsewhere, to pay into the fund, provided by $ 35-1-69 and by this section, the
amount provided by § 35-1-68, if she leaves no
dependents. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n. 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d
752 (1946).
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'oayment" near the beginning of Subsection
•j"aMii); substituted "an amount" for "a
.weekly amount" and "persons" for "person" in
Subsection t2)ib)(ii); and deleted former Subjection <2)<d> providing that if the total award

35-1-77

to dependents did not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier was to pay the
difference between the award and $30,000 into
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

\pportionment of liability.
— Prerequisite.
[mpairment not meeting 10^ minimum.
Zited.

and not an industrial accident, a claimant is
not entitled to disability benefits. Large v. Industrial Comm'n. 758 P 2d 954 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

apportionment of liability.
The purpose of this section is to apportion
iability only where an industrial injury measurably contributes to a permanent disability
:aused in part by a pre-existing condition, not
iimply to impose liability on the Employers
leinsurance Fund any time a workers disabilty is caused by a pre-existing condition. Virgin
\ Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 'Utah Ct.
Vpp. 1990).

Impairment not meeting 10% minimum.
Where claimant's industrially-caused 5% impairment of the back did not meet the 10%
threshold minimum requirement, he could not
combine the permanent impairment resulting
from separate industrial injuries with the
same employer in order to reach the threshold
necessary for compensation of preexisting coniitions. neither caused nor aggravated by any
of the industrial injuries. Otvos v. Industrial
Comm'n, 751 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

-Prerequisite.
Entitlement to benefits is a prerequisite to
onsideration of apportionment. Where the disability is the result of preexisting conditions

Cited in American Roofing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n. 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d
1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

15-1-75.

Average weekly wage • liasis of computation.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

lourly employees.
-Minimum hours.
The fact that an employee voluntarily lim:ed his work hou r s to 13 per week did not
lake it unfair to award him compensation
enefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had
itended to limit an hourly employee to the

actual number of hours he or she worked per
week in calculating the compensation rate, the
Legislature would not have included a statutory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection < l)(e).
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

S5-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con
sultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses,
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission
55
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Appendix 8
Rule 4o, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDI IRE

k u l e '( i

decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah,

Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.

Rule I

certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties,

(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certiorari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari
which shall comply in all respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then
be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve
four copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all
parties in the case of the date of the filing and of the certiorari docket number
of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21 A cross-

469

Tab 9

Appendix 9
Definition of "Permanent Impairment"
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
American Medical Association

Chapter 1

Concepts
of ImDairment
Eval* uun
1

i traduction

he AMA Guides to the Evaluation ofPermanent
Impairment {the Guided provides a reference
framework within which physicians may evaluate and report medical impairment and within which
lonmedical recipients of information about impairment
nay understand and make appropriate use of the medi:al information they receive.
The unique value of the Guides as tfte technical
eference of choice for evaluation of medical impairnent, which goes well beyond its broad scope of coverige (all body parts and systems), arises from the precise
ipplication of fundamental medical and scientific
oncepts; the systematic analysis that introduces each
>f the clinical chapters; the detail of the medical evaluaion protocols; and the thorough state-of-the-art analyes that underlie the rating tables. In addition, a format
3r reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized
t the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide
traightforward and well-structured guidelines so that
sports about the same individual from different observ
rs are likely to be of comparable content and comleteness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed
ad compared
As is true of any other technical process, knowing
le "rules," which in the case of the Guides ait the
)ecific procedures described in the clinical chapters,
not enough. The user of the Guides, both physicians
id nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts
rider which the "rules" have been developed and the
tended approach for using them to achieve objective,

T

accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individuals with medical impairment. This chapter and Chapter
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment
embodied in the Guides.

I11! MU i < HLsicierations
Impairment-Disability-Handicap
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment,"
"disability" and "handicap," appear in laws, regulations
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordination of the ways in which they are used. It is no wonder,
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about
their meaning. The definitions used in the Guides seek
to remedy this confusion through detailed description
and delineation of the domain in which each term is
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that
are important, not the word used .as the label Accordingly even when the terminology of the Guides may
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a
particular law, regulation or administrative system, analysis of the context in accordance with the following
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within
the provisions of a particular disability system
The accurate and proper use of medical information to assess impairment in connection with disability
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas
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impairment is a medical matter; disability arises out
of the interaction between impairment and external
demands Consequently as used in the Guides,
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's
health status that is assessed by medical means- "disability" which is assessed by nonmedical means,
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet
personal, social, or occupational demands or to meet
statutory or regulatory requirements Simply stated,
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an
individual, "disability" is the gap between what the
individual can do and what the individual needs or
wants to do
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessarily "disabled" Impairment gives rise to disability only
when the medical condition limits the individual's capacity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields
and activities x On the other hand, if the individual is
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet independent of, both "impairment" and "disability" although
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of
these terms Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that individual has an impairment that substantially limits one
or more life activities, including work, has a record of
such impairment, or is regarded as ha\mg such an
impairment3 The terms of this definition are so indefinite and broad that, technically; almost any person who
desires to do so might be included in the class of the
handicapped under the law
As a matter of practicality; however, a "handicap"
may be operationally understood as being manifest in
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional
activity An individual with limited functional capacity
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by
compensating in some way for the effects of an impairment Such compensation, or; more technically,
"accommodation" normally entails the use of assistive
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids,
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equipment), modification of the environment, and/or modification of tasks or activities (such as increased time for
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks) Any

one these modalities, or all in combination, may be
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome
a barrier to an objective If the individual is not able
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation
or if there is no accommodauon that will enable the
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handicapped, the individual is also disabled On the other
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish
a task or activity without accommodation is with
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped
nor disabled
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the
importance of examining the context in which the term*
"impairment," "disability" or "handicap" appear to avoid
being misled by imprecise usage For example, reference to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides,
an evaluation of impairment The physician does not
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the
purpose of paying a disability benefit

1 The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth
finger of the left hand illustrates the point If the individual is a bank
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other
hand a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled

3 The law does n3t make clear by whom the individual must be
regarded" as being handicapped There are cases on record in which ar
employer 'accommodated" the individual even though there was no
clear evidence or record of medical impairment In these cases it was
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the
law because the employer, by offering accommodauon had regarded th
individual as handicapped

2 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Employability-Management/
Administrative Considerations
The concept of "employabihty" deserves special attention, for m an occupational setting, if an individual,
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the
job demands and conditions of employment as defined
by the employer, the individual is employable, and,
consequendy not disabled As an operational matter,
employabihtj) is critically related to an individual's
capacity to travel to andfromwork, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the
employer is willing to pay wages If the individual has
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment,
then the individual is not disabled for that job When
these capacities are called into question, for whatever
reason, the employer must carry out an "employabihty
determination"
As in determination of disability, there are both
administrative and medical components to the employ
ability determination, the process by which an employer
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suit
ability for employment On the administrative side,
management will specifically assess performance capability to estimate the likelihood of a performance failun
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as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability m
case of human failure If neither likelihood of failure is
too great, then the individual is considered to be employable in a particular job This represents a fundamental
"go" or 'no go" determination that there is or is not a
sufficient match between an individual and the job
requirements to give further consideration to employment It is different from a "desirability" determination,
which would rank and compare the individuals who
are employable
During the course of employment, there is
on-going reassessment of an individual's employability
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and attendance Employment continues until the employee leaves
voluntarily or until a change gives nse to a deficiency
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that retention in the job can no longer be justified When an
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disabled, because of a change in health, or alleges that a
medical condition has caused a service deficiency, the
employer has little choice but to conduct an employability determination and to assess the individual's
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and
to perform assigned tasks and duties Disability, then, is
the default result when it is determined that the individual lacks employability

Employability—Medical Considerations
As noted above, an employable individual has the capacity to travel to andfromwork, to be at work, and to
perform assigned tasks and duties On the other hand,
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is
unwilling, to travel to andfromwork, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable
The issue of disability arisesfromthe critical questions
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, traveling to andfromwork, being at work, or performing
assigned tasks and duties The answer is found in a
"medical determination related to employability"
Thefirstcritical task in carrying out a medical
determination related to employability is to learn about
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliability, availability, productivity, expected duration of useful service life and any other criteria associated with
qualification and suitability Sufficiently detailed informationfroma job analysis will provide a basis upon
which a physician determines exactly what lands of
medical information are needed, and to what degree of

detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to
demand criteria Once the medical information needs
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evaluation protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information
However, a special medical evaluation may not be
necessary, foi; presumably, an individual who alleges
disability would already be under the care of a personal
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition
is interfering with life activities on or off the job And,
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof the
place to start, then, is with review of medical information already available m the form of medical office and
hospital records Through this medium, the physician
making the determination of employability may communicate with the personal physician to learn whatever
is known about that individual's health so that, in accordance with established medical diagnostic criteria and
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the
two physicians may come to agreement about what is
and is not known medically about the patient and determine what other information is necessary to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty This is nothing more or
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative
management of their patients The practice of medicine
is not an adversary process, and, consequendy, by
relying on communications and decisionmaking procedures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of
impairment and medical determinations related to
employability may be managed without confrontation
between them With respect to employability, then, the
medical questions to be answered are whether or not
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency,
whether or not the documentation provides reason to
believe that the medical condition has either caused or
contributed to the deficiency
If review of the documentation does not show
that the individual has met the required burden of
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide
whether or not acquisition of additional medical information is likely to enable the individual to do so Oi;
there may be a need to verify clinical findings contamed in the documentation provided If so, the medical evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medical evaluation by any physician, foi; in general, two
4 If the medical condition does not, for example preclude daily travel to
and from a physical therapy clinic, then it would be unlikely for the
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work Or, if an
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying groceries from doing chores around the house or from going to the movies
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condiuon
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace

physicians examining the same patient under the same
protocol will have approximately the same set of
findings Taken with the prior information, the results
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclusions that can then be compared with the demand
criteria for the job This can always be done with credibility and confidence, since the specifications for the
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to
begin with
When approached in this way, the medical input
into the employabihty determination will be quite independent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack
of it Moreover, because this process provides medical
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need
never occur

1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides
Since any person has only one health status and only
one life situation, given enough information about each,
it is possible to understand the relationship and interaction between them Moreover, because the evaluation
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but
culminates the evolution of changes m health that result
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical
information with the results of a current cluneal evaluation, earned out in accordance with the protocols of the
Guides, to charactenze fully and assess medical impairment Accomplishment of this objective is based on
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the
fundamental components of the Guides
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the
kinds of information needed to document the nature of
an impairment and its consequences, specifies procedures for acquinng the information, and defines a structured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting
the information A summary of these requirements and
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical
chapter
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, function, or system, each developed by recognized medical
specialty consultants These protocols are defined in
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient
information to desenbe fully and charactenze the current clinical status of a medical impairment
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols If

the protocols and tables have been followed, the clinicalfindingsmay be compared directly to the cntena
and related to a percentage of impairment with
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the
determination
Operationally the key to effective and reliable
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical
medical office and hospital records maintained by the
physicians who have provided care and treatment smce
the onset of the medical condition Such records compnse clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge
summanes, operative notes, pathology reports, laboratory test reports and the results of special tests and
diagnostic procedures Before formal evaluation is earned out under the Guides, analysis of the history and
course of the medical condition, beginning with the
circumstances of onset, and includingfindingson previous examinations, the course of treatment, responses
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an
impairment is permanent and well stabilized
This lnfomiation gathenng and analysis serves as
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a permanent impairment is earned out It is most important that
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary
to characterize fully the medical condition in accordance with requirements of the Guides', an incomplete
or partial evaluation is not acceptable Once this task is
accomplished, the clinicalfindingsmay be compared
to the clinical lniormation already contained in the
records about the individual If the current findings
are found to be consistent with the results of previous
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then,
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as
appropnate or required, with the reference tables to
determine the percentage rating of the impairment
However, if thefindingsare not m substantial accordance with the information of record, then, until further clinical evaluation resolves the dispanties, the
rating step is meaningless and cannot be earned out
This approach takes advantage of the fact that
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with
each other orally and in wnting to determine what they
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine
further what additional information they need to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty It does not make sense,
therefore, to manage cases in which there are diffenng
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical
third party to adj udicate an issue of medical fact' Such
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differences are best handled through the ordinary process of everyday patient management Then, with reference to the past medical documentation, the medical
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physician and nonphysician users of the Guides may venfy
that sufficient medical information has been assembled
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment,
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to support a rating in accordance with the tables At that
point, it is a straightforward matter to venfy whether or
not a numencal rating of impairment is substantiated
in accordance with the cntena contained in the Guides

1.3 Medical Impairment and
Workers' Compensation
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either
sustains an injury or incurs an illness ansing in the
course of and out of employment is entitled to protection against financial loss without being required to
sue the employer In exchange for their having lost the
nght to sue, the workers' compensation system guarantees benefits to all workers who are covered under the
law and who meet the cntena for award of benefits
The types of payments that may be made when a
claim is approved fall into three categones
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages
due to temporary total disability,
• payment of medical bills, and
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent
disability, partial or total
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as
being related to functional capability or the lack of it
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability,
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is
to be compensated monetarily
Payments are made for temporary total disability
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to
work is expeaed, and the medical condition has not
stabilized5 Temporary disability is partial when the individual returns to work but is not earning at the pnor
level
5 In accordance with the earlier discussion temporary total disability"
occurs when the medical condition precludes the individual from traveling to and from work, being at work and performing assigned tasks and
duties

A permanent disability award is normally independent of the individual's capacity to work and is
formulated in terms of expeaed or presumed long-term
or permanent economic loss associated with a permanent medical impairment, such as an amputation Such
an award may be paid according to a schedule that
specifically associates impairment with certain body
parts, functions, or systems, examples are amputations,
loss of sight, and loss of heanng, and a schedule is
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average
weekly wages
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a
law, in recognition that the "loss of" or "loss of use of"
the body part, function, or system may be less than
total, requires determination of the proportion or percentage of loss For example, in Maryland, the law says
In all cases where there has been an amputation
of a part of any member of the body herem specified, or the loss ofuse of(emphasis added) any
part thereof the Commission shall allow compensation for such proportion of the total number of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss
of use of the entire member as the afifeaed or
amputated portion bears to the whole6
Moreover, because not all conditions that can arise
out of an injury are accounted for m a schedule, back
injunes, for example, there is likely to be a provision of
the law similar to the following
In all other cases of disability other than those
specifically enumerated disabilities7 which disability is partial in charaaer, but permanent in
quality, the Commission shall determine the portion or percentage by which the industrial use of
the employee's body was impaired as a result of
the injury and in determining such portion or
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industnal
loss, the Commission shall take into consideration, among other things, the nature of the
physical injury, the occupation, expenence,
training, and age of the injured employee, and
shall award compensation in such proportion
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks 9
(emphasis added)
6 Workmen s Compensation Law of Maryland Annotated 1983 Art
101 §36(3)
7 Note the context with which "disability" and "disabilies" are used
Clearly the terms should be read as 'impairment" and 'impairments'
8 Should this read 'disability"?
9 IbtdAn

101 36(4)(a)

While medical infonnation is necessary for the decision
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that
information. Neither in this example nor in general is
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical
condition may be combined with knowledge of the
other factors to calculate the percentage by which
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired.
Accordingly each commissioner or hearing official must
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assessment of the available medical and nonmedical
information.
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating
needs to define its own process for translating knowledge of a medical condition into an estimate of the
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet statutory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the
impairment. We encourage each system not to make
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability,
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not
intended.
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical
information with more than a number that represents a
percentage of impairment To the extent that the physician provides a comprehensive medical picture in the
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure
1), the user of the information will be able to determine
how the medical informationfitswith all the other
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true understanding of the impact of the medical impairment on
the claimant's future employability.
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Affidavit of Stuart L. Poelman
with House Bill 218
attached as Exhibit A thereto.

James Black, #0347
Attorney at Law
Callister Duncan & Nebeker
Kennecott Bldg. Ste 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Dennis V. Lloyd, #1984
Attorney at Law
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-8149
BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GARY E. CROSLAND,
Applicant/Respondent,

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH;
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY;
and SMITH ADMINISTRATORS,
Defendants/Petitioners.
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AFFIDAVIT OF
STUART L. POELMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*
*
*
*

Court of Appeals
No. 910291CA

*

Comes now the affiant, Stuart L. Poelman, being first duly sworn and deposes as
follows:
1.

That he is an attorney practicing law in the State of Utah and specializing

in workers' compensation cases.
2.

That in 1988 and in years prior thereto he was a member of the Industrial

Commission's Advisory Council and actively participated in the consideration of legislative
changes to be proposed by said Council.

3.

That in 1987 and 1988, management and labor factions serving on the

Advisory Council were unable to agree on legislation regarding the Second Injury Fund.
As a result, an ad hoc committee was formed by certain members of the Council, including
the affiant, as well as attorneys practicing workers' compensation law and industry
representatives. This committee proposed, drafted, sponsored and lobbied through passage
by the legislature House Bill No. 218, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

The main problem which House Bill No. 218 addressed was maintenance of

the fiscal integrity of the Second Injury Fund which bore the responsibility for the
payment of certain benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Of concern was
the fact that the Second Injury Fund was predicted by consulting actuaries to become
insolvent unless remedial measures were taken.
5.

The intended purpose of House Bill No. 218 was to enhance the funding of

the Second Injury Fund through an employer's premium tax increase and to reduce the
liability of the Second Injury Fund for workers' compensation benefits. The bill eliminated
benefits which were then being paid to injured employees for permanent partial disability
compensation resulting from permanent partial impairment caused by preexisting
conditions. The bill also served to reduce certain reimbursements made to employers by
the Second Injury Fund. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the Second Injury
Fund had been held liable for permanent partial impairment which had been caused by
preexisting conditions. It was the intent of House Bill No. 218 to eliminate that liability.
6.

Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the employer responsible for a

particular industrial accident was shielded from liability for that portion of permanent
partial impairment caused by preexisting conditions. It was never the intent of House Bill
-2-

No. 218 to transfer the liability for impairment caused by preexisting conditions from the
Second Injury Fund to the employer. Rather, it was the intent of said legislation to
eliminate permanent partial disability benefits payable to the injured employee to the
extent that permanent partial disability compensation related to permanent partial
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions.
7.

It was never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer liable for

compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting conditions. All preexisting conditions
related to asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial impairment were
to go uncompensated.
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(g) Nephi, Juab County;
(h) Fillmore, Millard County;
(i) Beaver, Beaver County;
(j) Manti, Sanpete County;
(k) Junction, Piute County;
(1) Loa, Wayne County;
(m) Panguitch, Garfield County;
(n) Kanab, Kane County;
(o) Castle Dale, Emery County; and
(p) Monticello, San Juan County.

KM (3) Existing courtrooms and auxiliary space
in secondary locations shall be made available to the
circuit court by counties on a shared basis with the
district court and juvenile court.
Section 8. Sections Repealed.
Section 78-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 21, Laws of Utah 1982,
Section 78-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last
amended by Chapter 21, Laws of Utah 1982, Section
78-3a-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last
amended by Chapter 11, Laws of Utah 1986, Second
Special Session, Section 78-3a-5, Utah Code Anno*
tated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 47, Laws of
Utah 1986, and Section 78-4-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 47, Laws of
Utah 1986, are repealed.

CLARIFYING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO CONTROL MEDICAL CARE OF INJURED EMPLOYEES;
AMENDING THE PREMIUM TAX IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND;
PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
ACCIDENTS; AMENDING STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS; MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTTVE DATE.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
35-1-45, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75,
LAWS OF UTAH 1984
35-1-65.1, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 287,
LAWS OF UTAH 1981
35-1-66, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 357,
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
35-1-68, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 126,
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
35-1-77, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 41,
LAWS OF UTAH 1982
35-1-78, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 287,
LAWS OF UTAH 1981
35-1-99, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211,
LAWS OF UTAH 1986
35-2-56, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 161,
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
59-9-101, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 12,
LAWS OF UTAH 1987, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION
REPEALS AND REENACTS:
35-1-67, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 160,
LAWS OF UTAH 1985
35-1-69, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 79,
LAWS OF UTAH 1984

CHAPTER 116
BLB.No.218
Passed February 24,1988
Approved March 14,1988
Effective July 1,1988
SECOND INJURY FUND ELIGIBILITY
AMENDMENTS
By Franklin W. Knowlton
AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS'COMPENSATION; CHANGING THE NAME OF THE
SECOND INJURY FUND; CLARIFYING
THAT PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
COMPENSATION ENTITLEMENTS ARE
BASED ON PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT
CAUSED BY AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT;
ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS AND PROVIDING AN OFFSET
BASED ON CERTAIN OTHER INCOME;
MODIFYING PROVISIONS REGARDING
AWARDS FROM THE SECOND INJURY
FUND; MODIFYING PROVISIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION AS IT RELATES TO STATUTES OF LIMITATION;

REPEALS:
35-1-100, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
287, LAWS OF UTAH 1981
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1984, is
amended to read:
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
[Every] Each employee mentioned in Section
35-1-43 who is injured!;] and the dependents of
[every! each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of [OF] and in the course of his employment, wherever suchlnjury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death, and such amount for medical,
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as
provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
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employer and its insurance earner and not on the
employee.
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piration of aueh eight year period] hearing under
Section 35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial
disability award from the commission.

Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 35-1-65.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 287, Laws of Utah 1981, is
amended to read:

[In no caoc ohnil the weekly] Weekly payments
may not in any case continue after the disability
ends, or the death of the injured person.

35-1-46.1. Temporary partial disability —
Amount of payments.

In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66-2/3% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 66—2/3% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years,, up to a maximum of four
such dependent children, but not to exceed 66-2/3%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of
weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for
temporary total disability and temporary partial
disability, to wit:

[Where] (1) If the injury causes temporary partial
disability for work, the employee shall receive(rd«ring ouch dioability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a
period of not to exceed eight years from the date of
the injury,] weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 66-2/3% of the difference between [that] the
employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the weekly wages [that] the employee is
able to earn (thereafter j after the accident, but not
more than [a maximum-efl 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury [per week and
in addition thereto); plus

For the loss of::
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(l)Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder
(forequarter amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint,
or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below
elbow joint proximal to insertion of
biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint
distal to insertion of
biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or
midmetacarpal amputation . . . . 168
(b) All fingers except thumb at
metacarpophalangeal joints . . . 101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint
or with resection of
carpometacarpal bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint
or with resection of
metacarpal bone
42
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint .. 18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint
or with resection of
metacarpal bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal
joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal
joint or with resection
of metacarpal bone
17
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal joint
13

(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but only
up to a total weekly compensation that does not (tej
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of injury [per week].
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from
fatten] the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for [aueh purpose
prior to the expiration of aueh eight year period]
hearing under Section 35-1-99.
[In no ease shall the weekly payments continue
after the disability ends or the death of the injured
employee.]
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
Section 3, Section Amended.
Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 357, Laws of Utah 1983, is
amended to read:
35-1-46. Permanent partial disability —
Scale of payments.
[The commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight years of
ter the date of injury to an employee whose physical
condition resulting from aueh injury io not finally
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury]
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who
files an application for [such purpose prior to the ex •
533

Ch.116

Laws of Utah

(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal
joint or with resection
of metacarpal bone
8
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal joint
6
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 4
(B) Lower extremity
(l)Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy
(leg, hip and pelvis)
156
(b) Leg at hip joint or
three inches or less below
tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional
stump, at knee joint or
Gritti-Stokes amputation or
below knee with short stump
(three inches or less below
intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with
functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation
(Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation . 44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of
metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal
joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint . . . 12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of
metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint. 3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal
joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal
joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing .. 100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be
deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the
complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed
(B)(4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall
be determined and paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies of
500,1000,2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of
hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in
frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall not
be considered in determining compensable disabil-

ity. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000,
and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists.
[^P^e^byc^ai8,, is defined as hearing lose common
to persona of advanced age and is considered to be
due to general environment rather than industrial
conditions.)
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of
medical and paramedical professionals appointed
by the commission shall measure the loss in each
ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and
3000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average
decibel loss, lb determine the percentage of hearing
loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for each
decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1-1/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is
reached at 92 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear
by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss
in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting
figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss.
Compensation for permanent partial disability for
binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by
100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in
this chapter. Where an employee files one or more
claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing
loss previously found to exist shall be deducted from
any subsequent award by the commission. In no
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total
or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks
of compensation benefits.
[For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily
function not otherwise provided for herein, such pc
nod of compensation as the commission shall deem
equitable and in proportion no near ao may be to
compensation for specific looo as act forth in the
schedule in this section but not exceeding in any
case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the pe
nod of compensation for permanent total looo of bod
ily function.]
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided for
in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent
partial disability compensation shall be awarded by
the commission baaed on the medical evidence.
Compensation for any such impairment shall, as
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific
losses in the schedule set forth in this section. Permanent partial disability compensation may not in
any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent total
loss of bodily function. Permanent partial disability
compensation may not be paid for any permanent
impairment that existed prior to an industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and in
no event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
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tion at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' Reinsurance
Fund payments shall commence immediately after
the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied
its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69.
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of
50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.

Section 4. Section Repealed and Reenacted.
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 160, Laws of Utah 1985, is
repealed and reenacted to read:
35-1-67. Permanent total disability—
Amount of payments,
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused
by an industrial accident, the employee 3hall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter
requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security
Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections
404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.

(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order
that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68
(1), for use in the rehabilitation and training of the
employee.

(2) For permanent total disability compensation
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:

(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under
the State Board of Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate
the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may
waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of
the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is
not possible, the commission shall order that the
employee be paid weekly permanent total disability
compensation benefits. The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by the commi88ion based on the facts and evidence, and ends
with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady
work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily
function, the awarcfshall be for permanent partial
disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any
rehabilitation effort under this section.

(a) Compensation per week may not be more than
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury^
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than
the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the
maximum established in Subsection i a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum
weekly compensation rate under Subsection lb)
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable
for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disabTF
ity compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may
not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this
section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and
35-1-66, in excess of the amount of compensation
payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation
shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance
carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund's liability to the employee.

(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the
use of both hands, bolii arms, both feet, both legs',
both eyes, or any combination of two such body
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No
tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in any such instance.
Section 5. Section Amended.

(4) After an employee has received compensation
from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensa-

Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1987, is
amended to read:
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36-1-68. Employers1 Reinsurance F u n d —
Injury causing death — Burial expenses —
Payments to dependents.

fits as the commission may determine under Subsection (2) (b) (ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the
employee. This presumption shall not apply after
the initial six-year period and, in determining the
then existing annual income of the surviving
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any
federal Social Security death benefits received by
that surviving spouse.

(1) There is created [a Second Injury Fund] an
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of
making payments in accordance with Chapters 1
and 2, Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all monies
[heretofore] previously held in [that fund dcoig
natedas] the "Special Fund," [er] the "Combined Injury Fund," [and whenever reference is made cloc
where in] or the "Second Injury Fund." Whenever
this code refers to the "Special Fund," [er] the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund"
that reference [shall be deemed] is considered to be
[to] the [Second Injury Fund] Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the (Second Injury Fund] Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its
distribution. Reasonable administration assistance
may be paid from the proceeds of [that] the fund.
The attorney general shall appoint a member of his
staff to represent the [Second Injury Fund] Employers' Reinsurance Fund in all proceedings brought to
enforce claims against it.

(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the
time of the death, the payment shall be 66-2/3% of
the decedent's average weekly [wages] wage at the
time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per weekfr-fce]. Compensation shall continue
during dependency for the remainder of the period
between the date of death and [not to execcd] the expiration of six years or 312 weeks after the date of
injury as the commission in each case may determine [and shall]. Compensation may not amount to
more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with
the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and any amount awarded
by the commission under this subsection [must]
shall be consistent with the general provisions of
this title.

(2) If injury causes death within [the] a period of
six years from the date of the accident, the employer
or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of
the deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons
as follows:
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment by the employer
or its insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus
$5 for a dependent spouse [and], plus $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to
a maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not [to exceed] exceeding the average weekly
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, [but]
and not [to execcd] exceeding 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week!;
to]. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the
date of the death and [net te exceed] the expiration
of six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.

(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly
dependent under Subsection (2) (a) (iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing
at the time of the dependency review and may be
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person
would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to
such persons during their dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(c) Ifthere are wholly dependent persons and also
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the
commission may apportion the benefits as it
[deems] considers just and equitable; provided, that
the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned
[shell] do not exceed the maximum provided for by
law.

(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency following the expiration of
the first six-year period described in Subsection (2)
(a) (i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during
that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any
weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid
to those wholly dependent persons.

(d) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of death and the total amount of the
awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier
to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage settlement,
does not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between the
amount paid and $30,000 into the [Second Injury
F*»d] Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for
in Subsection (1).

(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to
review by the commission at the end of the initial
six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any
such review it is determined that, under the facts
and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or
nondependent person and shall be paid such bene-

Section 6. Section Repealed and Reenacted.
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1984, is
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repealed and reenacted to read.

Section 7. Section Amended.

35-1-69. Payments from Employers—
Reinsurance Fund.

Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
last amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1982, is
amended to read:

(1) If an employee who has at least a 10% whole
person permanent impairment from any cause or
origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an accident arising out of and in the course
of the employee s employment, and if the additional
impairment results in permanent total disability,
the employer or its insurance carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of benefits as follows-

3S-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director
or medical consultants — Discretionary
authority of commission to refer case —
Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(l)(a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation
for injury by accident, or for death, ansing out of or
in the course of employment, and [where] if the employer or its insurance earner denies liability, the
commission may refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the commission (and having]. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel
[oet forth-ta] under Section 35-2-56

(2) The employer or its insurance earner is liable
for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and the initial three years of permanent total disability compensation as provided in this title.
(3) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the
first $20,000 shall be paid in the first instance by the
employer or its insurance earner. Then, as provided
in Subsection (6), the Employers Reinsurance Fund
shall reimburse the employer or its insurance earner for 50% of those expenses.

(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of
a controverted case, the commission in its sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical
consultants on a full-time or part-time basis for the
purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate
fact-finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the
use of a medical director or medical consultants,
they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as required of a
medical panel.

(4) After the initial three-year penod under Subsection (1), permanent total disability compensation payable to an employee under this title becomes
the liability of and shall be paid by the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund.
(5) If it is determined that the employee is permanently and totally disabled, the employer or its insurance earner shall be given credit for all pnor
payments of temporary total, temporary partial,
and permanent partial disability compensation
made as a result of the industnal accident. Any
overpayment by the employer or its insurance earner shall be reimbursed by the Employers Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6).

(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultants shall [thea] make such study
take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations [where] if authonzed
by the commission, as it may determine [and thereafter] to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall make a report in wnting to the
commission in a form presenbed by the commission,
and also make such additional findings as the commission may require.

(6) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the
Employers Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the
employer or its insurance earner for the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and
compensation paid to or on behalf of an employee. A
request for Employers Reinsurance Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied by satisfactory
evidence of payment of the medical or disability
compensation for which the reimbursement is requested. Each request is subject to review as to reasonableness by the commission. The commission
may determine the manner of reimbursement.

(c) The commission shall promptly distnbute full
copies of the report [of the panel] to the applicant,
the employer, and [the] its insurance earner by registered mail with return receipt requested. Within
[fifteen] 15 days after [sweh] the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the
employer, or [the] its insurance earner may file with
the commission wntten objections [in wnting
thereto] to the report. If no wntten objections are
[so] filed within [sueh] that penod, the report [shaM
be deemed] is considered admitted in evidence (ami
the].

(7) If, at the time an employee is determined to be
permanently and totally disabled, the employee has
other actionable workers' compensation claims, the
employer or insurance earner that is liable for the
last industnal accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be Liable for the benefits payable
by the employer as provided in this section. The employee's entitlement to benefits for pnor actionable
claims shall then be determined separately on the
facts of those claims Any previous permanent partial disability arising out of those claims 3hall then
be considered to be impairments that give nse to
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liability under this
section.

(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the panel, medical director, or
medical consultants, but [shall] is not [be] bound by
[9«eh] the report if [there is] other substantial conflicting evidence in the case [wh*eh] supports a contrary finding [by the commission].
(e) If objections to [sraeh] the report are filed, the
commission may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved[,andatouch] At
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pensation — Limitations of action.

the hearing, any party so desiring may request the
commission to have the chairman of the medical
panel, the medical director or the medical consultants present at the hearing for examination and
cross-examination For good cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or
medical consultants, to be present at the hearing for
examination and cross-examination [Upon ouch
hearing the]

[When] (1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an [injuryj industrial accident in the service of
his employer fails to give written notice within 180
calendar days to his employer or the commission of
the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury,
[within 48 hours, when possible, or fails to report for
medical treatment within that time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; provided, that knowledge of the injury obtained from
any source on the part of the employer, his manag
ing agent, superintendent, foreman, or other person
in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the in
jured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the cm
ploycr to make an investigation into the facto and to
provide medical treatment is equivalent to this no
ticc; and no defect or inaccuracy in the notice oub
jceta the claimant to this reduction, if there was no
intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in
making his defense, and the employer was not, in
fact, so misled or prejudiced If no notice of the aeei
dent and injury is given to the employer within one
year after the date of the accident, the right to com
pensataon is wholly barred. Ifnoelaimforcompcn
aation is filed with the Industrial Commisoior*
within three years after the date of the accident or
the date of the last payment of compensation, the
right to compensation is wholly barred. However,
the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury
with the Industrial Commission, the employer, or
lto insurance earner, together with the payment of
any compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by the employer or an insurance earner, tolls the period forfilingthe claim until the cm
player or its earner notifies the employee, in writ
ing, of lto denial of liability or further liability for the
industnal accident or injury, with instructions upon
the notification of denial to the employee to contact
the Industnal Commission for further advice or as
oistance to preserve or protect the employees
nghto. The claim for compensation in any event
shall befiledwithin 8 years after the date of the aeei
dent-) the employee's claim for benefits under this
chapteFia wholly barred. If, for any reason, an employee is himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may file
it within the required 180-day penod. Receipt of
written notice is presumed if the employer complies
with the terms of Section 35-1-97 byfilingwith the
commission an accident report, or if the employer of
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical
benefits to or on behalf of the injured employee.

(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but [shell] may not be considered as evidence m the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of [sueh] the study and report
[by] of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the
[fund provided for by section 35 1 68] Employers'
Reinsurance Fund.
Section 8. Section Amended.
Section 35-1-78, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 287, Laws of Utah 1981, is
amended to read:
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award — No
authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction ofthe commission
over each case shall be continuing!, and it]. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from
tune to time [make ouch modification] modify or
change [with respect to] its formerfindingsfror]and
orders [with respect thereto, as in lto opinion may be
justified, provided, however, that records]. Records
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than [these] cases of total
permanent disability or [where] cases in which a
claim has been filed as m Section 35-l-99(rwfeieh
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10
years], may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shalT include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would
have otherwise become due and payable.
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as
modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
m
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Compensation Act.

(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an
employee's medical benefit entitlement, except with
respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance earner for payment, for a penod of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident
"*

(b) The commission has no power to change the
statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (a) in
any respect
Section 9. Section Amended.

(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total
disability benefits, temporary partial disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or
permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred,
unless an application for hearing isfiledwith the In-

Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is
amended to read:
35-1-89. Notice of injury and claim for comAM
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dustrial Commission within six years after the date
of the accident.
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred,
unless an application for hearing is filed within one
year of the date of death of the employee.
Section 10. Section Amended.
Section 35-2-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987, is
amended to read:
35-2-66. Partial permanent disability from
occupational disease or industrial injury
— Imposition of liability — Determination
of disability — Medical panel — Rehabilitation — Benefits.
(1) There is imposed upon the employer a liability
for the payment of benefits, as hereinafter provided,
to every employee who becomes partially and permanently disabled and such disability is primarily
caused or contributed to by a disease or injury to
health arising out of or in the course of employment,
subject, however, to the following conditions:
(a) No compensation shall be paid when the last
day of injurious exposure of the employee to the hazards of the occupational disease shall have occurred
prior to July 1, 1941.
(b) No compensation shall be paid unless such
partial disability results within two years prior to
the day upon which claim for such compensation
was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah.
(c) No compensation shall be paid unless the partial disability results within two years of the last
day in which the employee was exposed to the occupational disease.
(d) The time limit prescribed by Subsections (1)
(b) and (c) shall not apply in the case of an employee
whose disablement was due to occupational exposure to ionizing radiation; provided, that a claim for
such compensation shall be filed within one year after the date upon which the employee first suffered
incapacity from the exposure to radiation and either
knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known that the occupational disease
was caused by his present or prior employment.
(2) It is recognized that the measurement of partial permanent disability is a highly technical and
difficult task and should be placed in the hands of
physicians specially trained for the care and treatment of the occupational disease involved, and that,
particularly in cases of silicosis, such determination
should be by physicians limiting largely their practice to diseases of the chest; that the measurement
of the extent of such disability should not be determined by physicians in general practice nor by laymen. Where a claim for compensation based upon
partial permanent disability due to an occupational
disease or industrial injury is filed with the commission, the commission shall appoint an impartial
medical panel to consist of one or more physicians
specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim, and such medical panel
shall make such study, take such X-rays and per-
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form such tests as the panel may determine and certify to the commission the extent, if any, of the permanent disability of the claimant from performing
work for remuneration or profit, and whether the
sole cause of such partial permanent disability, in
the opinion of the panel, results from the occupational disease and whether any other cause or
causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or
in anywise contributed to the disability, and if so,
the extent (in percentage) to which such other cause
or causes has so contributed to the disability. The
report of the panel shall be made to the commission
in writing and shall be in substantially the following
form:
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL
Partial Permanent Disability Cases
l b the Industrial Commission of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

, Claimant
Claim No.

The medical panel, composed of the undersigned
physicians, has completed its study and examination of the above named claimant with respect to the
measurement of the ability of the claimant to perform physical labor* (but without regard to the education, experience or training of the claimant) and
on the assumption that the normal person functions
at 100%, finds as follows:
Percentage
Percentage
1. Extent of Permanent
Partial Disability from,
all causes (if any)
**2. Specific causes of
such disability:
a. Occupational
Disease (if any)
Name of Occupational disease
b. Other diseases
or injuries
Names of such diseases or injuries
c. Other contributing
factors

TOTAL
Dated

, 19_

(Medical Panel)
•Subsection 35-2-12 (e)t;] defines partial permanent disability as: "Partial permanent disability," as
herein used, is defined as that pathological condi-
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tion directly resulting from an occupational disease
and causing substantial physical impairment, evidenced by objective medical and clinical findings
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the
earning capacity of the employee, excluding,
however, total disability cases.

$45 per week, for not to exceed twenty weeks, such
payment to be made at four-week intervals and
upon the filing with the commission at two-week intervals of a certificate by the division of rehabilitation that the employee is cooperating with such division in his rehabilitation training.

••The sum of the percentages under (S«beee****) Paragraphsft]2[)]a, b, and c should equal the
percentage of [Subsections] Paragraph 1 and the
commission shall promptly distribute by mail full
copies of such report to the claimant, employer
against whom compensation is claimed and the insurance carrier. Thereafter any such party shall
have ten days to object, in writing, to such report,
and if no objections are filed with the commission
within such period, the percentage of partial disability caused solely by the occupational disease and
so certified by the medical panel shall be deemed accepted. The expense of such study and certification
shall be paid out of the fund provided for by Section
35-1-68 (1) and such study and certification shall
be a part of the record. If objections to such report
are filed, then it shall be the duty of the commission
to determine the percentage of such partial permanent disability after formal hearing, and at such formal hearing the party objecting must show by the
weight of the evidence the extent of such claimed
partial permanent disability and on appeal the evidence shall be reviewed as in equity cases.

At the termination of such training in rehabilitation, the employee shall be paid one-half of his
weekly compensation rate as determined in this section per week at four-week intervals until such time
as the total payments so made, plus the weekly payments received by the employee during rehabilitation training, equals a sum equivalent to that
amount determined under the following formula:
Multiply the percentage of partial permanent disability resulting from the occupational disease, as
determined by the medical panel (or in case of formal hearing, then by the commission), by 104 weeks
times the employee's compensation rate per week as
previously determined.
For example: Assume a finding by the medical
panel that the employee has sustained partial permanent disability from an occupational disease to
the extent of 25% loss ofbodily function and his compensation rate has been determined to be $80 per
week. The total amount payable would therefore be:
.25 x $80 x 104 weeks * $2,080 payable as follows:
20 weeks rehabilitation
$1,600
Balance at intervals of 4 weeks
480
TOTAL PAYABLE
2,080

(3) Where an employee has been found to be partially and permanently disabled by reason of an occupational disease, as provided in Subsections (1),
(2), (3), and (4) [provided], and the commission further finds that the employee is unable to obtain employment in his usual trade or occupation, or on application of either the employee or employer the
commission finds that it is to the best interest of the
employee so partially and permanently disabled by
reason of an occupational disease that he no longer
works at his usual trade or occupation, then it shall
be the duty of the commission to order that there be
paid to the division of vocational rehabilitation of
the State Board of Education out of the [second in
jury] Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by
Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use
in the rehabilitation and training of such employee,
such rehabilitation to be directed and controlled by
such division of rehabilitation acting in conjunction
with the Industrial Commission of Utah and shall
generally follow the practice applicable under Section [3§™1 69] 3S-1-67 and relating to the rehabilitation of employeeslnaving combined injuries].

Payments made for partial permanent disability
shall be credited to the employer and deducted from
any award which might ultimately be made should
the employee subsequently become totally and permanently disabled.
Section 11. Section Amended.
Section 59-9-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1987,
First Special Session, is amended to read:
59-0-101. Tax Basis — Rates — Exemptions.
(1) Except for annuity considerations, insurance
premiums paid by institutions within the state system of higher education as specified in Section
53B-1-102, and ocean marine insurance, every admitted insurer shall pay to the commission [for~depeeifc in the General Fund,] on or before March 31 in
each year, a tax of 2-1/4% of the total premiums received by it during the preceding calends year from
insurance covering property or risks located in this
state. This subsection does not apply to workers'
compensation and title insurance premiums, which
aretaxedunderSubsections(2)and(3). The taxable
premium under this subsection shall be reduced by:

(4) The benefits imposed upon the employer and
to which an employee found, as in this section above
provided, to be partially permanently disabled,
shall be entitled under this act, are limited to the following:
During those weeks in which the employee is actively in training under the division of rehabilitation, as in this section above referred to, the employee shall receive 66-2/3% of his average weekly
wages at the time the disability commenced, but not
more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time the disability commenced per week and not less than a minimum of

(a) all premiums returned or credited to policyholders on direct business subject to tax in this
state;
(b) all premiums received for reinsurance of property or risks located in this state; and
(c) the dividends, including premium reduction
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benefits maturing within the year, paid or credited
to policyholders in this state or applied in abatement or reduction of premiums due during the preceding calendar year.
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agents during the preceding calendar year from title insurance concerning property located in this
state. In calculating this tax, "premium" includes
the charges made to an insured under or to an applicant for a policy or contract of title insurance for

(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers'
compensation insurance in this state, including the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah under Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the tax commission, on or
before March 31 in each year, alia*} premium of between (&-Wfc] 1% and [3-#4fl>] 8% of the total [premiums] premium income received by [it] the insurer
from workers' compensation insurance in this state
during the preceding calendar year. The percentage
of premium applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial Commission [at least 00
days prior to the payment date, and any percentage
of premium over 3 • 1/4% shall reflect the reasonable
reserves necessary to maintain the Uninsured Em
plovers' Fund provided for in Section 35-1-107 in
an aetuanly sound financial condition] under Subsection (b). [Thio taxable] The total premium income shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b), but not as
provided in Subsection (1) (c). The tax commission
shall remit from the [tax] premium collected under
this subsection an amount [equal] of up to [3%]
7.15% of the premium income to the [Second Injury)
Employers' Reinsurance Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), an amount equal to 1/4% of the
premium income to the General Fund, an amount of
up to 1/2% and any remaining [applicable] assessed
percentage of the premium income to the Uninsured
Employers' Fund created under Section 35-1-107,
and an amount equal to. 1% of the premium income
to the Industrial Commission's Division of IndiiF
trial Accidents. [Ne-tejt] This .1% is a one-time
charge applicable to premiums received for calendar year 1988, for the purpose of funding the development, operation, maintenance, and improvements of the Division of Industrial Accidents' computer system. After 1988, this. 1% shall be added"to
the 7.15% remitted to the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.

(a) the assumption by the title insurer of the risks
assumed by the issuance! of the policy or contract of
title insurance; and
(b) abstracting title, title searching, examining
title, or determining the insurability of title, and
every other activity, exclusive of escrow, settlement,
or closing charges, whether denominated premium
or otherwise, made by a title insurer, an agent of a
title insurer, a title insurance agent, or any of them.
(4) Beginning July 1, 1986, former county
mutuals and former mutual benefit associations
shall pay the premium tax due under this chapter.
All premiums received after July 1,1986, shall be
considered in determining this tax.
(5) The following insurers are not subject to the
premium tax on health aire insurance which would
otherwise be applicable under Subsection (1):
(a) insurers licensed under Chapter 5, Title 31A;
(b) insurers licensed under Chapter 7, Title 31A;
(c) insurers licensed under Chapter 8, Title 3 LA;
(d) insurers licensed under Chapter 9, Title 31A;
(e) insurers licensed under Chapter 11, Title 3 LA;
(f) insurers licensed under Chapter 13, Title 3 LA;
and
(g) insurers licensed under Chapter 14, Title 3 LA.
(6) No insurer issuing; multiple policies to an insured may artificially allocate the premiums among
the policies for purposes of reducing the aggregate
premium tax applicable to the policies.
Section 12. Section Repealed.

(b) The Industrial Commission shall determine
the amount of the premium to be assessed each year
on or before each October 1. The Industrial Conv
mission shall make this determination following a
public hearing. The determination shall be based
upon the recommendations of a qualified actuary.
The actuary shall recommend a premium rate sufficient to provide payments of benefits and expenses
from these funds on a positive cash flow basis from
year to year, and sufficient to provide cash reserves
at the the beginning of each fiscal year of approximately $5,000,000 in the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund and $500,000 in the Uninsured Employers'

Section 35-1-100, as last amended by Chapter
287, Laws of Utah 1981, is repealed.
Section 13. Effective Date.
This act, except for Section 59-9-101, takes effect
on July 1,1988. Section 5^-9-101 has retrospective
operation to taxable years beginning on or after
January 1,1988.

FundT
(c) A premium that is to be transferred into the
General Fund may be collected on premiums received-from Utah public agencies or on premiums
collected by public agency insurance mutuals.
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(3) Every admitted insurer writing title insurance in this state shall pay to the commission, on or
before March 31 in each year, a tax of .45% of the total premium received by either the insurer or by its
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that the parties agreed to purchase and sell
parcel one based on the physical boundaries of the parcel and decided on a price
for that parcel without regard to the acreage of parcel one.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Kathleen NYREHN, Petitioner,
v.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Fred
Meyer Stores and/or Liberty Mutual
Insurance, Respondents.
No. 900010-CA.
Utah Court of Appeals.
Oct. 25, 1990.
Worker sought review of denial of
workers' compensation benefits.
The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1)
worker who did not appeal from administrative law judge's order in her favor could
raise claims of error with respect to his
findings which were adverse to her when
her employer appeals, and (2) worker established legal causation with respect to back
injury, notwithstanding her preexisting injury.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Workers' Compensation <s»1846
Worker was not required to appeal
from adverse rulings of administrative law
judge who entered an order in her favor in
order to assert as appellee on appeal that
those findings were erroneous.
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1939.7
Court is not required to give deference
to conclusions of Industrial Commission on
grounds that Commission has expertise and
familiarity with the work environment, al-

though there may be some complex work
activities which require deference to the
Commission's evaluation of whether workrelated exertion exceeds the exertion of
nonemployment life.
3. Workers' Compensation <3=554
Administrative law judge may not simply presume that finding of preexisting
condition warrants application of the Allen
test for determining whether there is a
causal relation between work and injury.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>554
Finding that worker's preexisting condition contributed to injury may not be
implied.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
0=763
Failure of agency to make adequate
findings of fact on material issues renders
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless
the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and
capable of only one conclusion.
6. Workers' Compensation <£=a552
Legal causation test to be applied to
workers who suffer from preexisting condition is not meant to prevent workers with
preexisting conditions from recovering benefits; higher standard of legal causation is
intended to offset the preexisting condition
of the employee as a likely cause of injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impairments
resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.
7. Workers' Compensation @=>517
When accident is climax of repeated
exertions, the work-related exertion is, for
purposes of proving legal causation, the
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exertions that established the accident; in determining whether there is causation, court
must consider the whole burden on the
camel, and not just the straw that breaks
the camel's back.
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>1542
Although worker suffered from preexisting back condition, evidence that, for two
and one-half months, she was required to
lift tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a
day showed that she engaged in activity
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which was not typical of nonemployment
activity and thus showed causation with
respect to her back injury.
William W. Downes, Jr., David Eckersley
(argued), Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Brad C. Betebenner, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson,
Salt Lake City, for Fred Meyer Stores.
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (argued), Salt Lake City, for Employers Reinsurance Fund.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
CONDER \ JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for
review of the Industrial Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits. We
reverse.
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included
pricing and sorting merchandise contained
in tubs which were approximately 2% feet
wide, 2V2 feet long, and Vk to 2 feet tall.
The tubs weighed between fifteen and forty pounds each, depending on the contents,
and were stacked upon each other. Nyrehn would lift and carry the tubs to and
from a sorting area approximately thirty to
thirty-six times a day. In addition to lifting the tubs, Nyrehn was involved in constant bending and stooping to sort merchandise into different tubs. On January
23, 1985, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Nyrehn felt a gradual onset of pain in her
lower back while performing her duties at
work. Despite the pain she continued to
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990).
2. In concluding that Nyrehn had not satisfied
the Allen test, the A.L.J. stated that he followed
the "legal doctrine" of Smith & Edwards v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct.
App.1989) (lifting 47'/: pounds by itself did not
constitute an unusual exertion). Nyrehn argues
that this statement indicates that the A.L.J,
based his conclusion on weight alone, which is
inappropriate. American Roofing Co. v. Indus.

work. The pain worsened until she finally
had to leave work early at approximately
4:00 p.m. After three back operations, Nyrehn's pain persisted and she was still unable to work. She therefore sought permanent disability benefits.
After a hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of January 23, 1985 was not the result of a certain
incident or activity, but rather the result of
"two and [a] half months of lifting tubs of
merchandise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2)
Nyrehn had an asymptomatic preexisting
condition, spondylolysis (disintegration or
dissolution of a vertebra); and (3) 75% of
Nyrehn's total permanent impairment existing at examination was "caused by the
industrial accident of January 23, 1985,"
and 25% was due to "preexisting incapacity
of spondylolysis."
The A.L.J, also made the following relevant conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured
her lower back "by accident" in that her
injury was neither planned nor foreseen;
(2) there was a direct medical causal relationship between the industrial accident
and Nyrehn's back problems; (3) due to her
preexisting condition, Nyrehn was required
to prove legal causation under Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986); and (4) Nyrehn's job duties of lifting
tubs of merchandise weighing between fifteen and forty pounds did not amount to
unusual or extraordinary exertion in excess
of the normally expected level of nonemployment activity for men and women in
the latter half of the twentieth century as
required in Allen.2
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed
to satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J. awarded Nyrehn permanent total disability beneComm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Fred Meyer, on the other hand, argues that the
A.L.J, considered the total circumstances since
at the conclusion of the hearing he referred to
various factors besides the weight of the tubs,
including the repetitive nature of the lifting.
Since we base our decision on other grounds,
we need not determine whether the A.L.J, erroneously applied a bright-line test rather than
consider the totality of the circumstances as
required by Smith & Edwards.
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fits. He refused to apply Allen because he
felt that the test was at odds with other
Utah Supreme Court cases indicating that
handicapped workers should not be placed
in a hardship in receiving compensation
benefits. He also indicated that he believed the Allen test to be unconstitutional
because it set a different standard for such
handicapped workers.
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial
Commission to review the A.LJ.'s award.
On review, the Commission adopted the
factual findings of the A.L.J, and his conclusion that Nyrehn failed to prove legal
causation as required under Allen. The
Commission then reversed the A.LJ.'s
award of benefits, indicating that despite
the A.L.J.'s concerns over the constitutionality of the Allen test, the Commission was
required to apply the test. The Commission concluded that inasmuch as Nyrehn
failed to satisfy the Allen test she was not
entitled to benefits. Nyrehn then petitioned this court to review the Industrial
Commission's order.
WAIVER OF APPEAL
[1] Fred Meyer argues that Nyrehn has
waived her right to challenge the A.LJ.'s
finding that she did not prove legal causation because she did not file her own motion for review of that finding with the
Commission.3 Fred Meyer erroneously relies on Pease v. Industrial Commission,
694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). In Pease, the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the following provision: ''(1) Any party in interest
who is dissatisfied with the order entered
by an administrative law judge or the commission may file a motion for review of
3. In essence, Fred Meyer urges us to adopt the
following rule: If an A.L.J, makes a possibly
erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law
that is contrary to the prevailing party, but
which did not prevent the party from prevailing,
that party must nevertheless seek review in order to preserve any challenge of the possibly
erroneous finding/conclusion in the event the
losing party moves for review.
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(2) (Supp.1990)
provides:

such
order."
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 35-1-82.53(1) (Supp.1983) (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded that
when an applicant files for review under
this section, he must raise all possible issues or the issues not raised would be
considered waived. Id. at 616. There is no
indication in Pease that a prevailing party
has an affirmative duty to seek review
from faulty findings. Nor do we perceive
any such duty in the language of the statute which is clearly permissive.
Although the conclusion of the A.L.J,
regarding legal causation may have been
faulty, any such error was rendered harmless to Nyrehn by the subsequent award of
benefits. If Fred Meyer had not filed for
review, she would have had her benefits.
Nyrehn simply did not have any reason to
appeal until the Commission denied her
benefits. Cf Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d
643, 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a
party has with the judgment as it was
entered—not grievances it might acquire
depending on the outcome of the appeal.").
In petitioning this court to review the denial of benefits, Nyrehn is seeking review of
the Commission's conclusion that she did
not prove legal causation. She is not seeking review of the A.LJ.'s conclusion. The
issue of whether Nyrehn proved legal causation is therefore properly before us.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Inasmuch as these proceedings were
commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the
effective date of the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA), we look to the prior case law to determine the proper standard of review.4
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial review that
are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern ail
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced
by or before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those proceedings are
still pending before an agency or a court on
January 1, 1988.
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review of agency findings of fact, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Commission, 776 P.2d 63, 66-68 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
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As to findings of fact, our review is
deferential. "[T]he reviewing court's inquiry is whether the Commission's findings
are 'arbitrary or capricious/ or 'wholly
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence' or
without 'any substantial evidence' to support them. Only then should the Commission's findings be displaced." Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah
1981).
As to the Commission's conclusion that
Nyrehn's work-related exertion did not satisfy the Allen test, our review is more
searching:
The question of whether the employment activities of a given employee are
sufficient to satisfy the legal standard of
unusual or extraordinary effort involves
two steps. First the agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what
were the employment-related activities of
the injured employee. Second, the agency must decide whether those activities
amounted to unusual or extraordinary
exertion. This second determination is a
mixed question of law and fact.
Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986).
[2] Our standard of review of mixed
questions of law and fact is an intermediate review for reasonableness and rationality. "The degree of deference extended
to the decisions of the Commission on these
intermediate types of issues has been given
various expressions, but all are variations
of the idea that the Commission's decisions
must fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality." Sisco Hilte v. Indus.
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review
of mixed questions of law and fact, see Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).
5. Fred Meyer urges us to give considerable deference to the conclusions of the Commission
because of its "expertise in and familiarity with
the work environment." Price River Coal, 731
P.2d at 1084. The deference we accord an agency's disposition under intermediate review fluctuates with the importance of the agency's expertise in determining the issue at hand:
The more likely it is that agency expertise will
assist in resolving an issue, the more deference courts should give to the agency's resolu-

Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Utah Dept. of Admin.
Series, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d
601, 610 (Utah 1983)).
"[Reasonableness must be determined
with reference to the specific terms of
the underlying legislation, interpreted in
light of its evident purpose as revealed in
the legislative history and in light 'of the
public policy sought to be served." This
standard appears to give us some flexibility in reviewing the otherwise objective standard that must be applied by the
Commission.
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm'nf
770 P.2d 1016, 1018 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
(quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs., 658
P.2d at 611).5
"Furthermore, to facilitate the purposes
of the legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and any
doubt as to compensation is to be resolved
in favor of the applicant." USX Corp. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Kaiser Steel Corp., 631 P.2d
at 892; McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, 567
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).
Guided by these standards we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant application of the higher
Allen test for legal causation and whether
the Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn
failed to prove legal causation was a reasonable and rational conclusion.
RECOVERY OF BENEFITS
In order to recover workers' compensation benefits, an employee must prove that
she was injured "by accident arising out of
tion. The less pertinent agency insight is—or
the more likely it is that judicial expertise will
be most helpful—the less deference need be
paid by reviewing courts to the agency's disposition.
Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d
432, 434 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
We recognize that there may be some complex work activities that require deference to
the Commission's evaluation of whether the
work-related exertion exceeds the exertion of
nonemployment life, but in general the Commission is no better suited to compare simple
forms of work-related exertion than are we
since "normal nonemployment life" is not within the Commission's area of expertise.
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:
.- .n*- i-ourse of [her] employment,"
i caa Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988)" "This
statutory language creates two prerequi
sites for a finding of compensable injury.
First, the injury must be 'by accident.'
Second, the language 'arising out of or in
the course of employment* requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment." Allen, 729
P.2d at 18. The Utah Supreme Court held
in Allen that a claimant must supply proof
of both '''legal" and "medical" causation
"Under the legal test, the law must define
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of
'arising out of the employment'
[then]
the doctors must say whether the exertion
(having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this [injury]." Larson, Workmen's Compensation
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277 (1986) quoted in
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.
To meet the legal causation requirement.
a claimant with a preexisting condition
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase
the risk [she] already faced in everyday
life because of [her] condition. This additional element of risk in the work-place
is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion serves to
offset the preexisting condition of the
employee as a likely cause of the injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impair
ments resulting from a personal risk
rather than exertions at work,
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25,6
Therefore, the only two issues 7 before
us are (1) whether Nyrehn was "suffering
6. This standard is often referred to as the higher
standard of Allen since, "(wjhere there is no
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient [to prove legal causation]."
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Compare Hone v. IF.
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986) (exertion of
putting on heavy pair of coveralls was sufficient
when claimant did not have any preexisting
back problems).
7. Fred Meyei does not challenge the A I J "s
finding that Nyrehn was injured "by accident."
Nor does it challenge the conclusion, of tl le
A.LJ. that the industrial accident was the medi
cal cause of Nyrehn's disability.
8. The A..L.J, did find—for purposes of ailocating
liability between the employer and the Em,ploy

from a preexisting condition which contributed] to the injury," Allen, 729 P.2d at 26,
and (2) did the work-related exertion which
caused Nyrehn's injury exceed the "usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Id. "If such a finding is
made, then ' n* requirement of legal cause
is -.-.* sfied u-'-ause "i .s presumed that the
er, vment .r.oreas^a "he HSK of injury to
whicr. that u.,ri\fr '-va- or her wise subject in
[her; noneniL.'-vment hie. ' Price River
Coal Co., Toi P.2d at iU»2.
Preexisting Condition
[3] An A.L.J, may not simply presume
that the finding of a preexisting condition
warrants application of the Allen test An
employer must prove medically that the
.nt "suffers from a preexisting condiruch contributes to the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. See, e.g., Price River
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082 (evidence proved
that preexisting conditions "contributed
greatly" to heart attack); Worker's Compensation Fund v. Indus. Common, 761
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (claimant suffered from narcolepsy and emphysema and
had a 36-year smoking habit, but no prior
history of heart disease, Allen test therefore did not apply when claimant died of
heart attack).
[4, 5] The factual findings of the Commission are silent as to whether Nyrehn's
preexisting back condition contributed to
the industrial injury.8 The A L.J. had
merely concluded as a matter of law that
ers* Reinsurance Fund—that. 75% of the total
permanent impairment existing at the time of
the examination was "caused by the industrial
accident of January 23, 1985," and 25% was due
to "pre-existing incapacity." Such an allocation,
however, is not proof that the preexisting condition somehow contributed to the injury of January 23, 1985, it only addresses the end result,
i.e., the total disability at the time of the examination. See, e.g., Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987) (5% impairment existed prior to accident, T/i% impairment existed following accident, therefore only
2'/2% attributed to the accident); cf. Zimmerman v. Indus. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1130
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (permanent impairment resulted solely from the preexisting conditions
and not from the industrial accident or any
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"[s]ince Ms. Nyrehn brought a pre-existing
low back condition to the workplace/' the
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal
conclusion is the critical factual finding
that Nyrehn's preexisting condition contributed to her injury. Such material findings,
however, may not be implied. In order for
us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)). The
failure of a trial court to make adequate
findings is reversible error. Id. Likewise,
the failure of an agency to make adequate
findings of fact on material issues renders
its findings "arbitrary and capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted
and capable of only one conclusion." Id.
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1983)).
Since we conclude that Nyrehn's work-related exertion satisfied even the higher
standard for proving legal causation, the
Commission's failure to make adequate
findings of fact was harmless. We therefore need not address whether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the Commission's implied finding.
Legal Causation
[6] The legal causation test adopted in
Allen is not meant to prevent workers with
preexisting conditions from recovering benefits.9 "Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by
an industrial accident is compensable
. . . . ' " Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (quoting
Powers v. Indus. Comm % 19 Utah 2d 140,
143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (footnote
omitted)).
combination of the accident with the preexisting
conditions).
9. "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers' Compensation Act

The higher standard of legal causation
adopted in Allen is intended to "offset the
preexisting condition of the employee as a
likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from
a personal risk rather than exertions at
work." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis
added). See also Price River Coal Co., 731
P.2d at 1082 (legal causation test "is designed to screen out those injuries that
result from a personal condition . . . rather
than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace"); Hone v. J.F.
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986)
(legal causation test is to distinguish between an injury which is "more likely than
not produced by a risk related to the employment from one that is caused by a
personal risk" (emphasis added)); Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.-d 237 (Utah
1987) (the fact that heart attack occurred
at work was a mere coincidence).
"[T]he key question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to
the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. In
order to answer this inquiry, we must first
determine what "exertion" is at issue: the
simple lifting of one tub of merchandise, or
the repetitive lifting of many such tubs
over an extended period of time.
The Commission found that Nyrehn's
pain resulted from "two and a half months
of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36
times a day." The industrial accident,
therefore, was not a single incident of lifting one tub of merchandise; it was the
climax of repetitive lifting. The Utah Supreme Court has broadly defined "accident" to include injuries which are the result of repetitive exertion.
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
liberally and in favor of employee coverage
when statutory terms reasonably admit such a
construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,
796 P.2d 676 (1990).

336

800 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

preclude the possibility that due to exer-

tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such a
manner as to properly fall within the
definition of an accident as just stated
above.
Carting v. Indus. Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d
260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) quoted with approval in Allen, 729 P.2d at 18.
7:

W'.HH an ncviden' .s \he climax of
v d "\»-rUfins as :r. Nyrehn's case,
>eia>u exertion. ' for purposes of
ng legal causation, .s "he aggregate
exertion of the repetitive exertions that
establish the accident. See Miera v. Indus,
• -:mn, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986)
*. . -nant's repetitive "jumps into an eight» -toie bv way of] a four-foot platform
* intervals constitute a con
.^er exertion than that en
- ^< ,n non-employment life"). In
"onsider the whole
...i not just the straw
that breaks the camel's back. See Smith
& Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (must consider all factors related to exertion); Workers'
Compensation
Fund., 761 P.2d at 575
(comparing cumulative effect of several
factors, including driver's fatigue, anxiety,
and the stress of driving through a snow
storm, with the exertion of nonemployment
life).
In Allen, the supreme court listed the
following examples of typical nonemployment activities: "taking full garbage
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an
automobile, lifting a small child to ch. t
height, and climbing the stairs
ings." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. While lifting
a tub of merchandise weighing between 15
and 40 pounds once or twice could likewise
fit into the list of examples above, lifting
such a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and
a half months is not a typical nonem
ployment activity. The foregoing moder
ately strenuous activities which may not be
considered unusual when performed once
or twice may nevertheless amount to unusual exertion when performed repeatedly.
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage
handlers, auto mechanics, childcare provid-

ers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing
examples.
(HI In the case before us it is unquestionable that two and a half months of
lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a
day would cause unusual and extraordinary
wear and tear on a body when compared
with the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729
P.2d at 26. The test is not whether the
type of exertion which caused the injury is
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather
whether the cumulative work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of exertion in
nonemployment life. We doubt that there
are many physical activities outside of the
\ :« kplace where this type of effort is being repeated so often over such a significant period of time.
The Commission's finding that Nyrehn's
work-related exertion was not an unusual
exertion was comparable to a conclusion
that the typical nonemployment activities
of people in today's society includes lifting
a full garbage can 30 to 36 times per day
each working day for two and a half
months. Merely stating the comparison
shows the fallacy of the Commission's finding", Nyrehn's back injury was not a coincidental injury which appeared at work without any enhancement from the workplace.
"[Her] employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk [she] alrea<i> faced in everyday life because of
[hen condition.'* Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.
The Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn
failed to prove legal causation was therefore not reasonable and rational

CONCLUSION
N") rehn's repetitive lifting of the tubs
over an extended period of time was an
unusual exertion as compared with the
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Aden, 729 P.2d at 26.
We therefore conclude that Nyrehn proved
legal causation. The Commission's order
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denying Nyrehn her workers' compensation
benefits is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to grant Nyrehn benefits for total permanent disability as calcu-

800 P 2d—9

lated by the A.L.J. Costs on review to
petitioner,
GARFF and CONDER, JJ., concur.

